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Political scientists, legal scholars, and engaged citizens have railed 
against partisan gerrymandering for decades, if not centuries.  This is not 
surprising, for, as the critics often observe, the core principle of republican 
government is that the voters should choose their representatives, not the 
other way around.1  And yet a majority of the Supreme Court was largely 
 
 * Copyright © 2005 Mitchell N. Berman.  Bernard J. Ward Centennial Professor in Law, The 
University of Texas at Austin.  Email: mberman@mail.law.utexas.edu.  I am indebted to Micah 
Altman, Renea Hicks, Sam Hirsch, Sam Issacharoff, Douglas Laycock, and Larry Sager for 
extremely helpful conversations and comments on an earlier draft and to Chris Macleod for 
excellent research assistance.  I am also grateful to the editors of the Texas Law Review, especially 
Nick Bunch and Arthur D’Andrea, for their flexibility and good humor. 
1. See, e.g., Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 516 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (Ward, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (remarking that “extreme partisan gerrymandering leads to a system 
in which the representatives choose their constituents, rather than vice-versa”), vacated and 
remanded by Am. G.I. Forum of Tex. v. Perry, No. 03-1396, 2004 WL 759440 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2004), 
Henderson v. Perry, No. 03-9644, 2004 WL 729280 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2004), Jackson v. Perry, No. 03-
782 Texas Law Review  [Vol. 83:781 
 
 
 
deaf to these criticisms before its 1986 holding, in Davis v. Bandemer,2 that 
claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders would be justiciable.  In so 
doing, however, the Bandemer Court announced such a demanding test for 
adjudicating gerrymandering challenges that no claims have succeeded in the 
nearly two decades that have ensued. 
Last spring, in Vieth v. Jubelirer,3 the Court entertained its first partisan 
gerrymandering claim since Bandemer.  Unfortunately, commentators who 
had hoped that Vieth would bring greater sense and order to the field were 
disappointed.  To be sure, Vieth did advance the ball in one critical respect: 
For the first time, all nine Justices agreed that excessive partisanship in 
redistricting is unconstitutional.4  All Justices also agreed that the Bandemer 
test was infirm.5  Beyond that, however, Vieth created uncertainty.  Even 
while acknowledging that excessive partisanship in redistricting does offend 
the Constitution, a four-member plurality of the Court would have overruled 
Bandemer by holding claims of partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable for 
want of a judicially manageable standard.6  Four other Justices steadfastly 
defended Bandemer’s holding as to justiciability, but proposed three separate 
tests, in three separate opinions, to replace the Bandemer approach that they 
agreed must go.7  Justice Kennedy stood alone in the middle.8  With the 
plurality, he expressed skepticism that a manageable standard could be 
devised,9 but, decrying the dangers of excessive partisanship, he also 
declared his reluctance to reach that conclusion prematurely.10  “If workable 
standards do emerge,” he insisted, “courts should be prepared to order 
relief.”11 
Although the uncertainty that Vieth has bequeathed is unfortunate, it is 
not wholly unexpected.  The chief message of the decision, after all, is that 
crafting judicially manageable tests for administering a ban on extreme forms 
of partisan gerrymandering is hard work.  And we’ve known that for 
generations; surely, few observers believed that Bandemer had solved the 
 
1391, 2004 WL 759434 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2004), Lee v. Perry, No. 03-1399, 2004 WL 759443 (U.S. 
Oct. 18, 2004), and Travis County v. Perry, No. 03-1400, 2004 WL 759444 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2004); 
see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1807 n.25 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (claiming that 
the architect of a gerrymandered map selects the constituencies and, in effect, the representatives). 
2. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
3. 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004). 
4. See infra subpart I(C). 
5. See infra subpart I(C). 
6. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1778, 1784 (plurality opinion). 
7. Id. at 1799 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1815 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 1822 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting).  But see infra note 125 (noting the fundamental agreement shared by all of the 
dissenters). 
8. Id. at 1792 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
9. Id. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
10. Id. at 1799 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
11. Id. 
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problem.  So Vieth reinforces what has long been clear—that the great 
challenge is to craft judicially manageable standards for adjudicating claims 
of unconstitutionally partisan gerrymandering.  Despite all the ink that legal 
scholars and political scientists have spilled on this very question, most 
extant proposals appear unsatisfactory for one of two reasons: Because the 
tests proposed are not manageable (such as the “predominant intent” test 
floated by Justice Stevens),12 or because, even if manageable, they are not 
clearly relevant to the constitutional violation (such as tests put forth by 
political scientists that depend upon compactness measures or swing ratios).13 
This Article tries to rectify some of these deficiencies.  Taking as a 
given that excessive pursuit of partisan advantage violates the Constitution,14 
it explores how judge-made constitutional doctrine should be crafted to 
administer this constitutional prohibition.  Very generally, I argue that the 
task ought to proceed in three steps.  First, courts need to elaborate on the 
notion of excessive partisanship as a matter of constitutional meaning.  
Second, courts must appreciate the logical structure of constitutional 
adjudication, i.e., the relationship between constitutional meaning and 
constitutional doctrine.  Third—and not sooner—courts should turn to 
political scientists for help crafting manageable constitutional doctrine to 
administer the constitutional meaning of excessive partisanship, as that 
meaning has been fleshed out in step one.  This recipe may appear obvious to 
some readers.  It is not, however, how contributors to the literature have 
tended to proceed. 
The structure of this Article roughly corresponds to those three steps.  
Part I sets the table by providing a thumbnail history of the Court’s grappling 
with partisan gerrymandering, culminating in a detailed review of the frac-
tured opinions in Vieth.  The remaining three Parts then confront the 
challenge of crafting a judicially manageable test for administering the 
(Vieth-recognized) constitutional prohibition against excessive partisanship 
in redistricting.  Part II elaborates on this constitutional meaning by 
clarifying the very notion of “excessive partisanship.”  Part III distinguishes 
 
12. Id. at 1809–10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
13. See, e.g., Richard G. Niemi, The Swing Ratio as a Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering, in 
POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 171, 176 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990) 
(suggesting that one crucial issue in gerrymandering cases should be “whether the swing ratio 
associated with a particular plan is particularly low in comparison with historical experience in the 
jurisdiction in question”). 
14. In making this assumption, I do not mean to suggest that it is self-evidently correct.  Still 
less do I claim that, if the proposition is true, the reasons why it is true are obvious.  For one brief 
yet suggestive sketch of some of the evils that partisan gerrymandering causes, see Daniel D. Polsby 
& Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Political Safeguard Against Partisan 
Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 304–09 (1991).  For a skeptical account, see Larry 
Alexander, Lost in the Political Thicket, 41 FLA. L. REV. 563 (1989).  Nonetheless, given the views 
expressed in Vieth, the assumption in the text is surely one that a constitutional lawyer may 
justifiably indulge. 
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between judicial elucidations of constitutional meaning and the “decision 
rules” that tell courts whether the dictates of constitutional meaning are 
satisfied in a given case, to explain how the Court can move from this fuller 
understanding of constitutional meaning to manageable constitutional 
doctrine.  Part IV proposes possible decision rules that courts might craft that 
would sensibly administer the constitutional prohibition against excessive 
partisanship in redistricting. 
Such decision rules can come in both wholesale and retail variants—that 
is, a rule could be designed either to cover all claims of unconstitutionally 
excessive partisanship in redistricting or to address only certain fact 
situations describable with fair particularity.  Accordingly, Part IV offers the 
skeleton of one wholesale, or one-size-fits-all, decision rule.  But, 
recognizing the possible attractiveness of a more minimalist approach to this 
thorny problem, it also offers a few retail decision rules tailored to subclasses 
of redistricting cases in which excessive partisanship might be present.  One 
such subclass is represented by the notorious, mid-decade Texas 
gerrymander enacted in the fall of 2003.  Although avowedly and 
egregiously partisan,15 the redistricting was upheld in Session v. Perry by a 
three-judge district court applying Bandemer.16  Last October, however, the 
Supreme Court vacated the lower court’s ruling and remanded for further 
proceedings in light of Vieth.17  With an eye toward this especially important 
litigation—important for the stakes immediately at issue and because of its 
unusually high profile and symbolic salience—Part IV recommends a 
decision rule that directs courts to conclude that mid-decade redistrictings 
undertaken by a single-party-controlled state government are motivated by 
excessive partisanship—hence are unconstitutional—unless narrowly tailored 
to achieve a compelling interest.  This is a manageable test that bears an 
appropriate relationship to the evil of “excessive partisanship,” properly 
understood. 
 
*     *     * 
 
In the immediate aftermath of Vieth, federal courts’ first task will be to 
flesh out the meaning of “excessive partisanship.”  They then must endeavor 
 
15. Two commentators, not both known to be Democratic loyalists, deemed the Texas effort 
“about as partisan as they come.” Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Let’s Mess With 
Texas, 82 TEXAS L. REV. 1587, 1616 (2004). 
16. 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 457 (E.D. Tex. 2004). 
17. Am. G.I. Forum of Tex. v. Perry, No. 03-1396, 2004 WL 759440 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2004); 
Henderson v. Perry, No. 03-9644, 2004 WL 729280 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2004); Jackson v. Perry, No. 03-
1391, 2004 WL 759434 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2004); Lee v. Perry, No. 03-1399, 2004 WL 759443 (U.S. 
Oct. 18, 2004); Travis County v. Perry, No. 03-1400, 2004 WL 759444 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2004) (all 
vacating and remanding Session v. Perry, 298 F.Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004)). 
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to craft suitable decision rules—whether broad or narrow, wholesale or 
retail—to implement that meaning.  If the courts miss this opportunity, one 
might reasonably fear that the promise of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in 
Vieth will go unfulfilled.  So these early cases—Session notably among 
them—are critical for the future of partisan gerrymandering.  And if the most 
heated critiques of the practice are to be credited, they are therefore of 
fundamental importance to the health of American democracy. 
But the post-Vieth round of gerrymandering challenges bear an 
additional significance.  In searching for a judicially manageable standard to 
administer the constitutional prohibition on excessive partisanship in 
districting, the Court is also struggling with the conceptual or logical 
structure of constitutional adjudication.  Vieth makes unusually clear that the 
constitutional meaning that the Court discerns need not be identical to the in-
court constitutional doctrine that the Court crafts to administer that meaning.  
This is obvious and (I will argue) inescapable.  It is high time for the Court to 
face up to this fact forthrightly.18  A more sophisticated understanding of the 
relationship between meaning and doctrine will help point the way toward a 
workable solution to the problem of unconstitutional gerrymandering.  At the 
same time, a sincere search for such a solution can facilitate a more mature 
appreciation of the relationship between meaning and doctrine.  This Article, 
accordingly, aims both to contribute to the jurisprudence of partisan 
gerrymandering and to strengthen our collective understanding of the logical 
structure of constitutional adjudication. 
I. The Legal Landscape 
Partisan gerrymandering is not new.  The very term “gerrymander” is 
nearly 200 years old—having been coined in 1812 in reference to 
Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry and the salamander-like district he 
helped to create—and the practice much older still.19  For generations, 
however, the federal courts refused, on “political question” grounds, to police 
either gerrymandering or its close cousin, malapportionment.20  This Part 
reviews the Court’s pathbreaking decision, in Davis v. Bandemer,21 to hold 
 
18. That the Court has not yet done this is perhaps best exemplified by the striking failure of a 
seven-member majority in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), to clarify, in response 
to a fiery Scalia dissent, see id. at 454 (Scalia, J., dissenting), how Court-crafted constitutional 
doctrine can be legitimate, and resistant to change by Congress, without being constitutionally 
required.  For elaboration of this point, see Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 
VA. L. REV. 1, 18–29 (2004) [hereinafter Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules]. 
19. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1774–75 (2004) (providing a thumbnail history 
along with citations to relevant scholarship). 
20. Malapportionment involves the creation or preservation of electoral districts of different 
population sizes, so that the ratio of representatives to voters varies across districts.  Gerrymanders 
can involve districts of roughly equivalent, even equal, population sizes. 
21. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
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gerrymandering claims justiciable.  It then examines the Vieth decision in 
some detail.  First, though, it offers a nutshell summary of the road to 
Bandemer.  One lesson to be drawn from that narrative, simplified though it 
is, will be that the Court’s determination in Bandemer to try to police 
partisan gerrymandering was not the sudden innovation that Bandemer’s 
critics often suggest.  To the contrary, it was the predictable and hard-to-
resist outgrowth of a concern with the practice that had been deepening at the 
Court for a generation. 
A. Prehistory 
The story, in outline, is familiar.22  It starts, customarily, in 1946 with 
Colegrove v. Green,23 “the Court’s last, and possibly most strident, refusal to 
become involved in cases of malapportionment or gerrymandering.”24  The 
Colegrove plaintiffs had sought an injunction against the holding of 
congressional elections under Illinois’s districting scheme, which had not 
been modified since 1901 and had entrenched massive population 
inequalities between districts.25  Writing for a divided Court,26 Justice 
Frankfurter rejected the plaintiffs’ plea for judicial intervention, reasoning 
that Article I, § 4 of the Constitution entrusted apportionment matters 
entirely to Congress.27 “To sustain this action would cut very deep into the 
very being of Congress,” Frankfurter wrote. “Courts ought not to enter this 
political thicket.  The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State 
legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of 
Congress.”28 
 
 
 
22. For additional overviews, with which this summary is broadly consistent, see, for example, 
Gordon E. Baker, The Unfinished Reapportionment Revolution, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING 
AND THE COURTS, supra note 13, at 11 [hereinafter Baker, Unfinished Reapportionment 
Revolution]; Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of 
Political Fairness, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1643, 1647–60 (1993) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Elusive 
Quest]. 
23. 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
24. MARK E. RUSH, DOES REDISTRICTING MAKE A DIFFERENCE: PARTISAN REPRESENTATION 
AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR 16 (1993). 
25. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 550–51 (plurality opinion). 
26. Only two other justices joined Justice Frankfurter’s opinion for the Court; a fourth, Justice 
Rutledge, concurred only in the result.  The three remaining Justices on the case—Black, Douglas, 
and Murphy—dissented forcefully on Equal Protection grounds, noting the remedy suggested by 
Frankfurter—the ballot box—was illusory precisely because of the extreme malapportionment.  See 
id. at 569 (Black, J., dissenting). 
27. Id. at 552–54 (plurality opinion). 
28. Id. at 556 (plurality opinion). 
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Colegrove was abandoned sixteen years later29 when, in Baker v. Carr, 
the Court considered a challenge to another malapportionment resulting from 
continued reliance on a 1901 state statute and held that such cases were 
justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause.30  After noting that the political 
question doctrine “is primarily a function of the separation of powers,”31 
Justice Brennan harvested from prior cases six indicators of a nonjusticiable 
political question: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political 
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment 
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s 
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the 
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the 
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question.32 
Although the presence of any single factor in a particular case would 
justify dismissal,33 Brennan argued that none was present so as to prevent the 
Court from adjudicating malapportionment claims.34  In so arguing, he 
 
29. That Colegrove had become more fragile was perhaps suggested two years before Baker 
when, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the Court invalidated an Alabama statute that 
retooled the municipal boundaries of Tuskegee to exclude all but a handful of black voters.  
Plaintiffs challenged this gerrymander, alleging that the legislature’s creation of this “uncouth 
twenty-eight-sided figure” violated the Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and the 
Fifteenth Amendment.  Id. at 340.  Confronted by this outrage, not even Justice Frankfurter would 
counsel judicial restraint.  Writing again for the Court, Frankfurter sidestepped the Fourteenth 
Amendment claims but agreed that the gerrymander abridged the Fifteenth Amendment by stripping 
black citizens of their right to vote.  Id. at 345.  But the difficulty with this analysis, as Robert Dixon 
explained, 
is that it does not fit the facts.  Negro voters affected by shrinking of Tuskegee’s 
boundaries could still vote in all elections except city elections. . . .  They were the 
victims of a racially motivated action and were, of course, aggrieved.  But their generic 
complaint was not that there was an impairment of “voting rights” in the conventional 
sense of the term.  Rather, they were being excluded from the city by state action 
impermissibly grounded on race. 
ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND 
POLITICS 117 (1968); see also Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 348 (Douglas, J., concurring) (asserting that 
Justice Black’s Colegrove equal protection dissent ought to control); id. at 349 (Whittaker, J., 
concurring) (also rejecting the Fifteenth Amendment claim in favor of the equal protection one).  
Gomillion, in short, provided some further evidence that the political thicket might prove 
irresistible. 
30. 369 U.S. 186, 201 (1962). 
31. Id. at 210. 
32. Id. at 217. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 226. 
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specifically asserted that such intervention would not mire the courts in 
controversies which they were incompetent to resolve. “Judicial standards 
under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar,” Brennan 
insisted, “and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that 
a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious 
action.”35  But the Court stopped short of providing lower courts with any 
greater direction in applying this vague standard. 
Justice Clark’s concurrence scolded the Court precisely for refusing to 
articulate detailed standards for malapportionment claims.36  But the most 
withering criticism came in thundering dissents by Justices Frankfurter and 
Harlan.  Frankfurter berated the majority for “asserting destructively novel 
judicial power” in a “massive repudiation of the experience of our whole 
past” and also warned that the Court’s entry into the political thicket was 
doomed to failure.37  The Court’s lofty pronouncements on the sanctity of 
voting rights would eventually be exposed, he predicted, as “merely empty 
rhetoric, sounding a word of promise to the ear, sure to be disappointing to 
the hope.”38  Justice Harlan was equally skeptical, arguing pointedly that 
because the claim concerned the apportionment of a state legislature, the 
Equal Protection Clause had no room to operate unless the state’s apportion-
ment method was wholly irrational.  Here, Harlan insisted, Tennessee could 
reasonably determine that legislative apportionment by geographic region 
best balanced the diverse interests of the state’s citizens.39 
Notwithstanding these vigorous dissents, the Court immediately set 
itself to making good on Baker’s promise by announcing a test to govern 
malapportionment claims.  The now familiar one-person, one-vote rule arose 
from a trio of cases decided in 1963 and 1964—Gray v. Sanders,40 Wesberry 
v. Sanders,41 and Reynolds v. Sims.42 
Gray invalidated Georgia’s county-unit primary system for electing 
statewide officers, rejecting a vote-weighing mechanism similar to the 
federal electoral college.43  The system significantly diluted the votes of 
those living in more populated counties and, despite some last-minute 
tinkering by the legislature,44 the Court held that once a state had set voter 
 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 251 (Clark, J., concurring). 
37. Id. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
38. Id. at 270 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
39. Id. at 334 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
40. 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
41. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
42. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
43. 372 U.S. at 376–78. 
44. Id. at 372. 
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eligibility requirements, it could not then weight some votes more heavily 
than others without violating equal protection.45  “The conception of political 
equality,” Justice Douglas wrote for the Court, “can mean only one thing—
one person, one vote.”46  Wesberry v. Sanders condemned similar population 
disparities between Georgia’s congressional districts.47  Because the suit 
challenged congressional districting rather than state legislative 
apportionment, the Court grounded the one-person, one-vote rule in Article I, 
§ 2 rather than the Equal Protection Clause.48  The basic rule, however, was 
the same: “[A]s nearly as is practicable,” the Court insisted, “one man’s vote 
in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”49 
Reynolds v. Sims,50 decided four months later, involved a challenge to 
state legislative districts and therefore, like Gray, involved the Equal 
Protection Clause, not Article I, § 2.  But a majority held that the Wesberry 
rule applied here too—a state must “make an honest and good faith effort to 
construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal 
population as is practicable.”51  However, Chief Justice Warren explained, 
“some distinctions may well be made between congressional and state 
legislative representation.”52  Most particularly, the Court discerned reasons 
why it might be more important in the latter context for legislatures to try to 
maintain the integrity of political subdivisions.  “Somewhat more flexibility 
may therefore be constitutionally permissible with respect to state legislative 
apportionment than in congressional districting,” it concluded.53  A contrary 
rule, it recognized, might produce more harm than good, for 
“[i]ndiscriminate districting, without any regard for political subdivision or 
natural or historical boundary lines, may be little more than an open 
invitation to partisan gerrymandering.”54  This was small consolation to 
Justice Harlan, who in dissent charged that, by forceclosing state reliance on 
traditional districting factors, the Court had left states with few other 
options.55 
 
45. Id. at 379–81. 
46. Id. at 381. 
47. 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
51. Id. at 577. 
52. Id. at 578. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 578–79.  Some commentators read this passage as expressing the majority’s belief 
that one-person, one-vote could forestall partisan gerrymandering.  See, e.g., Issacharoff, Elusive 
Quest, supra note 22, at 1648 & n.29.  I read it, in contrast, to reflect the majority’s recognition that 
too stringent reliance on one-person, one-vote could indeed provoke legislatures to gerrymander by 
withdrawing from them the option of drawing lines in a way that would respect the interests of 
political subdivisions—an option that Chief Justice Warren, perhaps naively, seemed to suppose 
that legislatures would prefer were it open to them. 
55. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 622–23 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
790 Texas Law Review  [Vol. 83:781 
 
 
 
The Reynolds Justices were, therefore, clearly conscious of the problem 
of partisan gerrymandering, even as they directly engaged with the 
analytically distinct problem of malapportionment.  Because the practice of 
judicial review consistently favors rules over standards, however, a majority 
of the Court proceeded over the course of the decade to tighten the one-
person, one-vote rule from a guideline into something closer to a 
straightjacket—especially in congressional districting.56  Predictably, this 
development spawned a concomitantly growing worry among a minority of 
Justices that the Court was thereby opening the door wide for precisely the 
gerrymandering that even the Reynolds majority had warned against. 
The rulings in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler57 and Wells v. Rockefeller,58 
handed down on the same day in 1969, highlighted the dispute.  In 
Kirkpatrick, the Court clarified Wesberry’s “as nearly as practicable” 
standard for congressional apportionment, holding that “the command of Art. 
I, § 2, that States create congressional districts which provide equal 
representation for equal numbers of people permits only the limited 
population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to 
achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown.”59  According 
to Justice Brennan, Missouri had not made a good-faith effort to achieve 
equality, and its justifications—maintaining communities of interest and the 
difficulty of achieving legislative consensus—could not save the plan.60 
In Wells, the Court invalidated New York’s congressional 
apportionment plan for the same reason, while pointedly refusing to address 
related partisan gerrymandering claims.61  Four Justices—Fortas, Harlan, 
Stewart, and White—disagreed sharply with the majority’s insistence on 
precise mathematical equality.62  Justice Fortas concurred in both cases and 
 
56. As Samuel Issacharoff observed: 
   While the Supreme Court’s opinion in Reynolds left open the possibility that 
alternatives to the one-person, one-vote rule might satisfy constitutional norms, the 
logic of judicial review inexorably pushed the equipopulation principle to the fore.  
The very qualities of objectivity and manageability that made the equipopulation 
strategy appealing in Reynolds soon made it the sole arbiter of political fairness. 
Issacharoff, Elusive Quest, supra note 22, at 1651. 
57. 394 U.S. 526 (1969). 
58. 394 U.S. 542 (1969). 
59. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531. 
60. Id. at 531–33; see also White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973) (upholding invalidation of 
congressional apportionment plan for lack of good-faith effort to achieve absolute population 
equality, but reversing district court rejection of plan that followed legislative districting choices as 
much as possible while achieving population equality). 
61. Wells, 394 U.S. at 544, 546–47. 
62. See Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 538 (Fortas, J., concurring) (arguing that state legislatures 
should not have to “ignore the boundaries of common sense” to achieve precise mathematical 
equality of population in congressional districts); Wells, 394 U.S. at 549–50 (Harlan, J., dissenting 
joined by Stewart, J.) (ridiculing the “magic formula” of “one man-one vote” as practically 
unworkable and ineffective at preventing partisan gerrymandering); id. at 553–54 (White, J., 
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accused the Court of firming up the equal population requirement while 
simultaneously disallowing any conceivably legitimate excuse for 
deviation.63  Small population disparities should be tolerated, he argued, “in 
the absence of evidence of gerrymandering—the deliberate and arbitrary 
distortion of district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal 
political purposes.”64 
Objecting that “the Court’s exclusive concentration upon arithmetic 
blinds it to the realities of the political process,” Harlan took it upon himself 
to state what those realities are: “The fact of the matter is that the rule of 
absolute equality is perfectly compatible with ‘gerrymandering’ of the worst 
sort.”65  “If the Court believes it has struck a blow today for fully responsive 
representative democracy, it is sorely mistaken,” he elaborated, echoing 
Frankfurter’s Baker critique.66 “Even more than in the past, district lines are 
likely to be drawn to maximize the political advantage of the party 
temporarily dominant in public affairs.”67 
Yet even as a majority of the Court resisted appeals to address partisan 
gerrymandering, they also refused to tighten population requirements in the 
state apportionment context.68  In Gaffney v. Cummings, the Court upheld 
Connecticut’s legislative apportionment plan, adopted by a bipartisan 
districting board that deliberately sought rough proportionality between 
voters’ partisan preferences and party representation in the legislature, 
despite population deviations of almost eight percent among House districts 
and almost two percent among Senate districts.69  Justice White, who had 
dissented from Kirkpatrick’s strict equipopulation rule, wrote for the 
 
dissenting) (arguing that the possibility of precise mathematical equality in population among 
congressional districts is “illusory” and that the Court’s insistence on precise equality will require 
greater judicial involvement in congressional redistricting). 
63. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 536–37 (Fortas, J., concurring). 
64. Id. at 537–38. 
65. Wells, 394 U.S. at 551 (Harlan, J., dissenting from both Kirkpatrick and Wells). 
66. Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
67. Id.  Justice White sounded the same theme, contending that the marginal benefits achieved 
through enforcement of the rigid population equality standard of Kirkpatrick and Wells would be 
more than offset by the corresponding decrease in legislatures’ ability to minimize gerrymandering.  
He noted: 
   Today’s decisions, on the one hand require precise adherence to admittedly inexact 
census figures, and on the other downgrade a restraint on a far greater potential threat 
to equality of representation, the gerrymander.  Legislatures intent on minimizing the 
representation of selected political or racial groups are invited to ignore political 
boundaries and compact districts so long as they adhere to population equality among 
districts . . . . 
Id. at 555 (White, J., dissenting from both Kirkpatrick and Wells). 
68. See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324 (1973) (concluding that “Virginia’s 
legislative redistricting plan was not to be judged by the more stringent standards” applied in 
Kirkpatrick and Wells). 
69. 412 U.S. 735, 737 (1973). 
792 Texas Law Review  [Vol. 83:781 
 
 
 
majority.  Noting that Reynolds gave states more flexibility in apportioning 
their own legislatures than in drawing congressional district lines, Justice 
White emphasized that courts should tolerate minor deviations from absolute 
equality if the state had legitimate reasons for carving out districts as it did.70  
Observing that “[p]olitics and political considerations are inseparable from 
districting and apportionment,” the majority squarely rejected the contention 
“that any political consideration taken into account in fashioning a 
reapportionment plan is sufficient to invalidate it.”71  The majority held that 
the state’s pursuit of “political fairness” between Democrats and Republicans 
easily justified the departures from equipopulousness.72 
A decade later, the Court decided Karcher v. Daggett, which concerned 
a challenge to a New Jersey congressional apportionment plan that allegedly 
diluted Republican voting strength in Newark.73  Justice Brennan’s opinion 
for the Court analyzed the claims under Article I, § 2, Wesberry and 
Kirkpatrick, and invalidated the scheme solely because population deviations 
between districts did not reflect a good-faith effort to achieve population 
equality.74  Four dissenters opposed the majority’s insistence on near 
precision, invoking the by-now familiar objection that fastidious insistence 
on population equality would serve to facilitate, rather than impede, partisan 
gerrymandering.75 
Justice Stevens concurred.  Although agreeing that an insistence on 
equipopulousness alone would facilitate gerrymandering, he thought that, in 
this case, the small malapportionment was itself further evidence of partisan 
gerrymandering: 
 The Equal Protection Clause requires every State to govern 
impartially.  When a State adopts rules governing its election 
machinery or defining electoral boundaries, those rules must serve the 
interests of the entire community.  If they serve no purpose other than 
to favor one segment—whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or 
 
70. Id. at 741–43. 
71. Id. at 752–53. 
72. Id. at 753. 
73. 462 U.S. 725 (1983). 
74. Id. at 727.  In applying the Kirkpatrick standard in Karcher, the Court nonetheless discarded 
some of its more rigid characteristics.  Justice Brennan’s Kirkpatrick opinion had rejected a laundry 
list of justifications for population deviations among Missouri’s congressional districts.  See 
Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. 533–36.  But in Karcher, Brennan explicitly acknowledged that 
[a]ny number of consistently applied legislative policies might justify some variance, 
including . . . making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving 
the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent Representatives.  
As long as the criteria are nondiscriminatory, these are all legitimate objectives that on 
a proper showing could justify minor population deviations. 
Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740 (citations omitted). 
75. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 775–76 (White, J., dissenting). 
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political—that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point 
in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of the 
community, they violate the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection.76 
Stevens urged that equal protection’s straightforward mandate of 
neutrality could be enforced relatively easily by “consider[ing] whether the 
plan has a significant adverse impact on an identifiable political group, 
whether the plan has objective indicia of irregularity, and then, whether the 
State is able to produce convincing evidence that the plan nevertheless serves 
neutral, legitimate interests of the community as a whole.”77  And such 
objective indicia of irregularity, he explained, would not be hard to come by.  
They include “dramatically irregular shapes,”78 “[s]ubstantial divergences 
from a mathematical standard of compactness,”79 and “[e]xtensive deviation 
from established political boundaries.”80  Where a plaintiff can establish a 
significant adverse impact and objective indicia of irregularity and the state 
cannot show “that its plan is supported by adequate neutral criteria,” Stevens 
would have allowed courts to “conclude that the challenged scheme is either 
totally irrational or entirely motivated by a desire to curtail the political 
strength of the affected political group.”81 
For the four dissenters, Karcher furnished an opportunity to criticize 
Kirkpatrick’s strict equipopulation standard, its application to a plan with 
population deviation of less than one percent, and its detrimental effect on 
political fairness.  Justice White, whose opinion was joined by three other 
justices, reprised the warnings from his Kirkpatrick dissent.82  In hindsight, 
he observed, one of Kirkpatrick’s most significant effects may have been to 
“provid[e] a patina of respectability for the equipopulous gerrymander.”83  
He argued that the Court would do better to set a maximum permissible 
deviation; he suggested five percent.84  This would allow the states to give 
effect to considerations like compactness and preservation of political 
subdivisions in drawing congressional districts, without having to worry that 
their plans would later be invalidated for failing to achieve strict equality.85  
 
76. Id. at 748 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
77. Id. at 751 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
78. Id. at 755 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 758 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
81. Id. at 760–61 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
82. See Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 553–56 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Kirkpatrick and Wells holdings are “unduly rigid and unwarranted applications of the Equal 
Protection Clause which will unnecessarily involve the courts in the abrasive task of drawing 
district lines”). 
83. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 777 (White, J., dissenting). 
84. Id. at 781–82 (White, J., dissenting). 
85. Id. at 780 (White, J., dissenting). 
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It would have the additional virtue of substantially harmonizing the standards 
applicable to state and congressional apportionment.86 
Justice Powell was the only dissenter to engage Justice Stevens on the 
gerrymandering standards question in any detail.  He agreed with Stevens 
that gerrymandering could cause injuries of constitutional magnitude,87 and 
blamed Kirkpatrick’s “uncompromising emphasis on numerical equality” for 
“encourag[ing] and legitimat[ing] even the most outrageously partisan 
gerrymandering.”88  According to Powell, equal protection condemned 
apportionment schemes with “the purpose and effect of substantially 
disenfranchising identifiable groups of voters.”89  For him, as for Stevens, the 
clearest indicator of such disenfranchisement was the drawing of lines that 
could not be rationally defended on the basis of any coherent state policy.90  
Where state-drawn districts lack compactness, or disregard traditional 
political boundaries, the state should be required to articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the plan.91 
Powell agreed that, on the facts of the case, “one cannot rationally 
believe that the New Jersey Legislature considered factors other than the 
most partisan political goals and population equality.”92  Absent some 
compelling and legitimate state justifications—which Powell doubted the 
state could supply—the plan almost certainly violated equal protection.  
However, because the district court below had considered only the 
constitutionality of the population deviations, and the gerrymandering issue 
therefore was not at issue, Powell dissented only as to the majority’s 
unyielding application of Kirkpatrick.93 
B. Bandemer 
Although the Gaffney Court had upheld the Connecticut scheme against 
claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, the mere fact that it 
resolved the case on the merits might have suggested that such claims were 
justiciable.94  And Justices Stevens and Powell made clear in their separate 
Karcher opinions that they shared that view.95  However, the full Court did 
not squarely address the question until three years later (thirteen after 
 
86. Id. at 782 n.14 (White, J., dissenting). 
87. Id. at 787 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
88. Id. at 785 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
89. Id. at 788 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 788–89 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
93. Id. at 790 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
94. The Bandemer Court would later make just this point.  See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 
109, 119–20 (1986).  But see id. at 120–21 (discussing dicta from other cases, as well as summary 
dispositions, that seem to “look in different directions” on the question of justiciability). 
95. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 760–61 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 787 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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Gaffney) when, in Davis v. Bandemer, it confronted a challenge by Indiana 
Democrats to a redistricting scheme for the state House and Senate adopted 
by the Republican-controlled legislature. 
Justice O’Connor, Chief Justice Burger and then-Justice Rehnquist 
would have held claims of partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable.96  
Emphasizing the quintessentially political nature of redistricting, Justice 
O’Connor predicted that courts would be unable to craft a stable test that 
would not evolve into “a requirement of roughly proportional representation 
for every cohesive political group.”97  And such a requirement would 
constitute just the sort of fundamental policy determination inappropriate for 
the judiciary.98  Because claims of partisan gerrymandering would therefore 
be plagued either by “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards” or by “the impossibility of deciding [the dispute] without an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion,”99 they 
presented a nonjusticiable political question under Baker’s disjunctive six-
part test.100 
The remaining six Justices disagreed,101 arguing instead that Baker’s 
own conclusion that malapportionment claims are justiciable “applies equally 
to the question” of partisan gerrymandering.102  As Justice White explained, 
the easily managed “one person, one vote” rule of Wesberry and Reynolds 
had not yet been developed when Baker was decided, and the Baker Court 
“did not rely on the potential for such a rule in finding justiciability.”103  
Accordingly, there was little reason to fear that the Court could not also find 
a manageable way to adjudicate claims of partisan gerrymandering.104 
 
96. More precisely, and marginally more narrowly, they would have held nonjusticiable those 
partisan gerrymandering claims pressed by “major political parties.”  Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 144 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
97. Id. at 147 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  As we will see, this is a recurring claim, pressed by 
scholars as well as Justices.  See infra section II(B)(1). 
98. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 145 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
99. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
100. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
101. Justice White’s opinion concerning justiciability was joined not only by the three other 
members of the plurality but also by Justices Powell and Stevens.  See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 165 
n.4 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
102. Id. at 123. 
103. Id. 
104. The majority took issue not only with Justice O’Connor’s conclusion that partisan 
gerrymandering claims should be nonjusticiable, but also with the particular considerations upon 
which she relied in support of that conclusion.  Among other things, O’Connor had supposed that 
“political gerrymandering may be a ‘self-limiting enterprise,’” id. at 126 (quoting id. at 152 
(O’Connor, J., concurring)), and had worried that a holding of justiciability “will lead to ‘political 
instability and judicial malaise’ because nothing will prevent members of other identifiable groups 
from bringing similar claims.”  Id. at 126 (quoting id. at 147 (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (citation 
omitted).  This “analysis is flawed,” the majority concluded 
because it focuses on the perceived need for judicial review and on the potential 
practical problems with allowing such review.  Validation of the consideration of such 
amorphous and wide-ranging factors in assessing justiciability would alter substantially 
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But the majority split on the appropriate test.  All six Justices who 
agreed on justiciability agreed too that a successful claim of unconstitutional 
partisan gerrymandering required proof of “both intentional discrimination 
against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on 
that group.”105  They divided on how to measure the requisite discriminatory 
effect. 
Writing now for a four-member plurality, Justice White announced that 
“unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is 
arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of 
voters’ influence on the political process as a whole.”106  And then, either 
further elucidating this standard of consistent degradation or amending it, the 
plurality explained that “a finding of unconstitutionality must be supported 
by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or 
effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the 
political process.”107 
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stevens, rejected the plurality’s 
approach.  Although Powell criticized several aspects of the plurality’s 
opinion, at its core his opinion reprised the view that Justice Stevens had 
developed in his Karcher concurrence and with which Powell himself had 
then expressed sympathy in dissent.  To begin, Powell interpreted the 
Constitution to impose far more stringent limitations on partisan 
gerrymandering.108  Whereas the plurality, like Justice O’Connor, viewed the 
pursuit of partisan advantage as an inevitable and seemingly acceptable part 
of redistricting,109 Powell insisted, as Stevens had earlier, that “district lines 
 
the analysis the Court enunciated in Baker v. Carr, and we decline Justice O’Connor’s 
implicit invitation to rethink that approach. 
 Id. at 126–27. 
105. Id. at 127; id. at 161 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
106. Id. at 132. 
107. Id. at 133.  In language that would later be picked up by lower courts, see, e.g., Badham v. 
Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 670 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (three-judge court), summarily aff’d, 488 U.S. 1024 
(1989), the plurality proceeded to intimate that plaintiffs might be required to show that they “had 
essentially been shut out of the political process.”  Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 139. 
108. Id. at 166 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
109. See, e.g., id. at 128.  John Hart Ely contended that Justice O’Connor’s concurrence did not 
express any opinion about partisan gerrymandering but merely designated the issue nonjusticiable.  
John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L. REV. 607, 621 n.75 
(1998).  It is true, of course, that holding a claim nonjusticiable need not entail any judgment 
regarding the constitutionality or propriety of the practice challenged.  Nonetheless, the overall 
tenor of O’Connor’s opinion strongly suggests a belief that at least moderate forms of partisan 
gerrymandering are constitutionally inoffensive, and perhaps desirable.  See, e.g., Bandemer, 478 
U.S. at 145 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The opportunity to control the drawing of electoral 
boundaries through the legislative process of apportionment is a critical and traditional part of 
politics in the United States, and one that plays no small role in fostering active participation in the 
political parties at every level.”).  Relying on this passage, Pamela Karlan seems justified in reading 
O’Connor’s concurrence as an “endorsement of partisan gerrymandering.”  See Pamela S. Karlan, 
All Over the Map: The Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 284 & 
n.176. 
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should be determined in accordance with neutral and legitimate criteria.  
When deciding where those lines will fall, the State should treat its voters as 
standing in the same position, regardless of their political beliefs or party 
affiliation.”110 
More pointedly, Powell charged that, with its emphasis on consistent 
degradation and frustration of voters’ will, the plurality “fail[ed] to enunciate 
any standard that affords guidance to legislatures and courts.”111  Instead, 
again echoing Stevens, Powell urged that courts should be able to identify 
when legislatures have resorted (unconstitutionally) to partisan 
considerations by looking to three factors: “the shapes of voting districts and 
adherence to established political subdivision boundaries”; legislative 
procedures and legislative history that bear upon partisan motivation; and 
evidence concerning distribution of voters by party affiliation and statistics 
tending to show dilution of minority party influence relative to political 
support.112 
In light of the disagreements between Justices White and Powell, the 
opacity of the plurality opinion itself, and the fact, surprising to many, that 
the Court could hold gerrymandering claims justiciable yet uphold the 
instance actually before it, contemporary observers found it hard to say just 
what Bandemer required.113  But whatever its precise requirements, many 
anticipated that the test was unmeetable.114 
C. Vieth 
The assumption that Bandemer was toothless was confirmed in the 
years that followed.  Of the twenty suits challenging the drawing of district 
lines under Bandemer, courts denied relief in every one.115  A dozen years 
 
110. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 166 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
111. Id. at 171 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
112. Id. at 173 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
113. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman, Unresolved Issues in Partisan Gerrymandering Litigation, in 
POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 13, at 3, 3 (claiming that Bandemer 
“has given rise to considerable scholarly dispute over what the test of unconstitutional political 
gerrymandering will ultimately prove to be”); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 
(2004) (plurality opinion) (citing various commentators and courts). 
114. See, e.g., Charles Backstrom et al., Establishing a Statewide Electoral Effects Baseline, in 
POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 13, at 145, 150 (contending that the 
plurality’s standards, “if literally applied, would be impossible to meet”). 
115. Cases are collected in Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1778 n.6 (plurality opinion).  One much-noted 
case in which Bandemer appeared to have teeth involved a challenge to North Carolina’s system of 
electing superior court judges statewide instead of by districts.  See Republican Party of N.C. v. 
Martin, 980 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that the Republican Party had stated a cause of action 
under Bandemer); Republican Party of N.C. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 27 F.3d 563 (4th Cir. 
1994) (upholding preliminary injunction ordering computation of votes on single-district as well as 
state-wide bases).  But even this lone success for plaintiffs was short-lived: after all eight 
Republicans running for superior court judgeships were elected under the statewide scheme, the 
court of appeals vacated the injunction and remanded for reconsideration.  Republican Party of N.C. 
v. Hunt, 77 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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after Bandemer, John Hart Ely expressed the judgment of many when 
observing that, “by its impossibly high proof requirements the Court in 
Bandemer essentially eliminated political gerrymandering as a meaningful 
cause of action.”116 
The Vieth litigation exemplifies the point.  As a result of the 2000 
census, Pennsylvania lost two congressional seats to reapportionment, 
forcing the state to redistrict.  This the Republican-controlled General 
Assembly did with gusto, enacting a new districting scheme designed to hand 
the Republicans between 12 and 14 of the state’s 19 congressional seats, 
even though the Republican and Democratic Parties enjoy nearly equal 
support among the Pennsylvania electorate.117  The legislature accomplished 
this end by “sacrific[ing] every traditional districting principle—slashing 
through municipalities and neighborhoods, splitting counties, . . . producing 
oddly misshapen districts,” and pairing “six incumbents, five of whom are 
Democrats.”118  Nonetheless, a three-judge district court largely dismissed a 
challenge subsequently brought by Democratic voters.119  The General 
Assembly’s intent to discriminate against Democratic voters was patent.  But 
because the redistricting scheme gave the Democrats five safe seats, and 
because plaintiffs could engage in such activities as organizing, campaigning, 
and voting, the court reasoned, plaintiffs could not possibly establish that 
they “will be completely shut out of the political process.”120  This was, it 
seems, a fair application of Bandemer.  So when the Supreme Court noted 
jurisdiction, several election law experts understandably predicted that the 
Court was poised to put teeth into Bandemer.121 
Sure enough, all nine Justices agreed that the Bandemer test was 
unsatisfactory.122  But they fractured over what to do about it.  Writing in 
 
116. Ely, supra note 109, at 621; see also Issacharoff, Elusive Quest, supra note 22, at 1646 
(noting that Bandemer’s “standards are fundamentally unworkable and incorporate such ambiguous 
and unclear commands as to be unfit for any manageable form of judicial application”). 
117. Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2002). 
118. In any event, these are the plaintiffs’ allegations.  Brief for Appellants at 12–13, Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004) (No. 02-1580).  They are broadly consistent with findings made by 
the state trial judge, who nonetheless upheld the map.  See Erfer v. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325, 
350–52 (Pa. 2002) (App. A) (finding that the 2000 map split more communities and produced less 
compact and more irregular districts than previous maps); see also id. at 343 (Zappala, C.J., 
dissenting) (“If the record of this case does not establish unconstitutional political gerrymandering, 
no such claim exists.”).  The federal courts made no findings of fact, dismissing the challenge on a 
motion to dismiss.  Vieth, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 538 (accepting all facts alleged by plaintiff as true for 
the purposes of the motion to dismiss). 
119. See Vieth, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 549 (dismissing equal protection, § 1983, free association, 
and privileges and immunities claims while allowing a one-person, one-vote challenge to proceed).  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court likewise rejected a challenge brought by another group of voters 
alleging violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution.  Erfer, 794 A.2d at 334–35. 
120. Vieth, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 544. 
121. See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, The Great Election Grab, NEW YORKER (Dec. 8, 2003) (quoting 
Heather Gerken describing Vieth as a likely “effort to pull in the reins of partisan gerrymandering”). 
122. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004). 
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three separate dissents, four Justices—Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer—proposed new standards to replace the test put forth by the 
Bandemer plurality.123  Another four—Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Scalia, O’Connor, and Thomas—would have overruled Bandemer in toto, 
holding that claims of partisan gerrymandering raise nonjusticiable political 
questions.  Justice Kennedy was in the middle.  Agreeing with the plurality 
that none of the tests on the table was adequate, he voted to affirm the three-
judge court’s dismissal of the challenge.  But he would not join the plurality 
in holding all such claims nonjusticiable.  At least not yet. 
1. The Dissents.—Presenting themselves as united on what they took to 
be the central question raised by Vieth—“whether political gerrymandering 
claims are justiciable”124—the four dissenters nonetheless proposed three 
different tests to replace the ineffectual Bandemer test.125 
Not surprisingly, Justice Stevens pressed essentially the same argument 
that he had first put forth in Karcher and that Justice Powell (and he) later 
adopted in Bandemer.  That argument contained essentially two components: 
that political affiliation is simply not an appropriate basis on which to con-
figure district lines;126 and that, by attending to the appearance of the districts 
themselves (considering such criteria as bizarreness, lack of compactness, 
and disregard of political subdivisions) and to the procedures under which 
the district lines were adopted, courts can adequately recognize a prima facie 
case of an unconstitutional gerrymander.127  Furthermore, according to 
Stevens, these twin premises had already been endorsed in the Shaw line of 
cases for racial gerrymandering.128  Because he had long viewed racial 
gerrymandering as just a special case of partisan gerrymandering,129 it 
followed that courts should 
apply the standard set forth in the Shaw cases and ask whether the 
legislature allowed partisan considerations to dominate and control the 
 
123. See id. at 1799–1829.  Each of the four would have remanded for retrial in accordance 
with their preferred standards.  Id. at 1813 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1822 (Souter, J., 
dissenting joined by Ginsburg, J.); id. at 1829 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
124. Id. at 1799 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
125. In so doing, the dissenters took pains to downplay their differences.  See id. at 1813 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (deeming it “obviou[s]” that “several standards for identifying 
impermissible partisan influence are available to judges who have the will to enforce them” and 
observing that the Court “could endorse either of the approaches advocated today by Justice Souter 
and Justice Breyer”); id. at 1829 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (intimating that the dissenters would reach 
agreement on a test if they were able to secure Kennedy’s vote and thus become a majority); id. at 
1816 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting joined by Ginsburg, J.) (agreeing with Breyer on this point). 
126. Id. at 1801 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
127. Id. at 1801–02 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
128. Id. at 1802 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646–47 (1993) 
(Shaw I); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995); Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 
(2001); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905 (1996) (Shaw II)). 
129. Id. at 1801 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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lines drawn, forsaking all neutral principles.  Under my analysis, if no 
neutral criterion can be identified to justify the lines drawn, and if the 
only possible explanation for a district’s bizarre shape is a naked 
desire to increase partisan strength, then no rational basis exists to 
save the district from an equal protection challenge.130 
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, started by eschewing any 
search for an exact “verbal test for too much partisanship”131 and by 
embracing instead a more common-law approach that would be avowedly 
experimental and revisable.132  As he saw it, “[T]he Court’s job must be to 
identify clues, as objective as we can make them, indicating that partisan 
competition has reached an extremity of unfairness.”133  Preferring to “start 
anew” and analogizing to the Court’s Title VII jurisprudence, Souter 
proposed a test for partisan gerrymandering that required a “plaintiff to 
satisfy elements of a prima facie cause of action, at which point the State 
would have the opportunity not only to rebut the evidence supporting the 
plaintiff’s case, but to offer an affirmative justification for the districting 
choices, even assuming the proof of the plaintiff’s allegations.”134 
The prima facie case Souter advocated would have five required 
elements:135 (1) that the plaintiff belonged to a “cohesive political group” 
such as a major party; (2) that the district in which the plaintiff lived “paid 
little or no heed to those traditional districting principles whose disregard can 
be shown straightforwardly: contiguity, compactness, respect for political 
subdivisions, and conformity with geographic features like rivers and 
mountains;” (3) “specific correlations between the district’s deviations from 
traditional districting principles and the distribution of the population of [the 
plaintiff’s] group” sufficient to support “an inference that the district took the 
shape it did because of the distribution of the plaintiff’s group;” (4) a 
hypothetical district that included the plaintiff’s residence “in which the 
proportion of the plaintiff’s group was lower (in a packing claim) or higher 
(in a cracking one) and which at the same time deviated less from traditional 
districting principles than the actual district;”136 and (5) evidence “that the 
 
130. Id. at 1812 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).  Notice that his proposed test would 
underenforce what he had earlier identified as the constitutional violation.  It appears that, for 
Stevens, the Constitution is violated when partisan motivation supplied a but-for cause for the 
placement of any district lines, regardless of whether some alternative explanation is “possible.”  
Indeed, Stevens acknowledged that his proposed rule would leave the Constitution underenforced: 
“Such a narrow test would cover only a few meritorious claims, but it would preclude extreme 
abuses . . . .”  Id.  See infra text accompanying note 263. 
131. Id. at 1815 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 1816 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
134. Id. at 1817 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
135. Id. at 1818–19 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
136. “Packing” and “cracking” are the two primary tools of the gerrymanderer.  Opposition-
party voters are “packed” insofar as district lines are drawn so as to concentrate them in a relatively 
small number of districts in which they constitute supermajorities.  They are “cracked” when 
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defendants acted intentionally to manipulate the shape of the district in order 
to pack or crack” the plaintiff’s group.137 
Justice Breyer began by addressing an issue that had divided even the 
Bandemer majority that first held partisan gerrymandering claims justiciable.  
Allying himself with Justice White’s plurality against Justices Powell and 
Stevens, Breyer declared flatly that “[t]he use of purely political 
considerations in drawing district boundaries is not a ‘necessary evil’ that, 
for lack of judicially manageable standards, the Constitution inevitably must 
tolerate.”138  The value of partisanship in districting, according to Breyer, 
largely derives from the value of single-member districts themselves.139  
Compared to proportional representation regimes, single-member district 
systems “diminish the need for coalition governments” thereby “mak[ing] it 
easier for voters to identify which party is responsible for government 
decisionmaking.”140  But single-member districts can be volatile.  If the 
districts are drawn randomly, without attention to partisan composition, then 
“a small shift in political sentiment” could translate “into a seismic shift in 
the makeup of the legislative delegation.”141  Therefore, he concluded “that 
traditional or historically-based boundaries are not, and should not be, 
‘politics free.’ Rather, those boundaries represent a series of compromises of 
principle—among the virtues of, for example, close representation of voter 
views, ease of identifying ‘government’ and ‘opposition’ parties, and 
stability in government.”142 
But, Breyer cautioned, even though “[t]he use of purely political 
boundary-drawing factors”143 will often be justified by constitutional values, 
sometimes they won’t be.  And one circumstance in which partisan 
redistricting is unconstitutional, Breyer argued, involves what he termed 
“unjustified entrenchment”—the effort by “a party that enjoys only minority 
support among the populace . . . to take, and hold, legislative power . . . [as] 
the result of partisan manipulation and not other factors.”144  Expressly 
leaving open “whether political gerrymandering does, or does not, violate the 
 
splintered into a relatively large number of districts in which they constitute minorities.  Each 
method prevents opposition parties from achieving the efficiency that comes with holding a 
relatively small majority in a district. 
137. In a claim charging gerrymandering against a major party, Souter seemed to suggest that 
proof that the other major party controlled the state government, either by controlling the entire state 
legislature and the governorship or by having a veto-proof majority in the legislature, would be both 
necessary and sufficient on this fifth prong.  Id. at 1819 (Souter, J., dissenting).  In a claim charging 
discrimination against any group other than a major party, Souter noted only that “proof of intent 
could, admittedly, be difficult.”  Id. 
138. Id. at 1822 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
139. Id. at 1823 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 1824 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 1825 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
144. Id. 
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Constitution in other instances”—as, presumably, when a party with bare 
majority support gerrymanders to give itself a substantial supermajority of 
legislators—Breyer would hold unjustified entrenchment unconstitutional.145 
Recognizing that the problem of identifying unjustified entrenchment is 
not “easily solved, even in extreme instances,” Breyer nonetheless expressed 
confidence that “courts can identify a number of strong indicia of abuse.”146  
Very generally, these indicia fall into two categories: evidence that a party 
with majority support across the state has consistently failed to achieve a 
majority of the seats in the relevant elections, and evidence that the 
legislature has substantially departed from redistricting norms.  Without 
proposing any specific judicial test that might dictate a conclusion of 
unconstitutional gerrymandering in a given case, Breyer observed that the 
stronger the evidence of one type, the less the courts need demand of the 
other.147 
2. The Plurality.—A plurality consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas had no difficulty concluding that the 
test advanced by the Bandemer plurality did not satisfy Baker’s call for a 
judicially manageable standard—just as O’Connor, joined by Rehnquist, had 
predicted in her Bandemer concurrence.  Describing that standard as 
“misguided when proposed” and unimproved “in subsequent application”148 
and observing that it had produced “one long record of puzzlement and 
consternation”149 in the lower courts, the plurality, through Justice Scalia, 
rejected it “as a constitutional requirement.”150 
And in the plurality’s view, the “totality-of-the-circumstances analysis” 
offered in Justice Powell’s Bandemer dissent fared no better.  Under this 
approach, the plurality said, “all conceivable factors, none of which is 
dispositive, are weighed with an eye to ascertaining whether the particular 
gerrymander has gone too far—or, in Justice Powell’s terminology, whether 
it is not ‘fair.’”151  But “fairness,” Scalia concluded, 
does not seem to us a judicially manageable standard. . . .  Some 
criterion more solid and more demonstrably met than that seems to us 
 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 1827 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
147. Id. at 1828–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
148. Id. at 1777 (plurality opinion). 
149. Id. at 1779 (plurality opinion). 
150. Id. at 1770 (plurality opinion).  In light of criticisms I have elsewhere leveled against the 
Court’s conditional spending doctrine, see Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: 
Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 30–42 (2001); Lynn A. Baker & 
Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, 
and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459 (2003), I cannot help 
observing that “one long record of puzzlement and consternation” fairly describes the lower federal 
courts’ experience with South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), as well.  See id. at 464–69. 
151. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1784 (plurality opinion). 
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necessary to enable the state legislatures to discern the limits of their 
districting discretion, to meaningfully constrain the discretion of the 
courts, and to win public acceptance for the courts’ intrusion into a 
process that is the very foundation of democratic decisionmaking.152 
Having made short work of Bandemer, the plurality marched through, 
and rejected, all the other standards for adjudicating claims of partisan 
gerrymandering that remained on the table—one proposed by the Vieth 
plaintiffs and the three developed in the Vieth dissents.153 
Plaintiff-appellants had proposed a test that retained the intent-plus-
effect approach of the Bandemer plurality but endeavored to cure the 
particular defects of that earlier effort.  The proposed intent prong would be 
more demanding than the intent prong from Bandemer by requiring plaintiffs 
to “show that the mapmakers acted with a predominant intent to achieve 
partisan advantage” in the sense that “other neutral and legitimate 
redistricting criteria were subordinated to the goal of achieving partisan 
advantage.”154  The effects prong of the proposed test would rectify the 
vagueness of the Bandemer test by requiring plaintiffs to show both that the 
challenged scheme “systematically ‘pack[s]’ and ‘crack[s]’ the rival party’s 
voters” and that “the map can thwart the plaintiffs’ ability to translate a 
majority of votes into a majority of seats.”155  By the plurality’s lights, this 
proposal was triply infirm: the intent prong was not judicially manageable, 
and the effects prong was neither manageable nor discernible. 
In criticizing the plaintiffs’ intent standard, the plurality took aim at a 
central assumption underlying it: that because the Court’s racial 
gerrymandering jurisprudence prohibited a predominant intent to 
discriminate on the basis of race, that same predominant intent test must also 
be manageable in the partisan gerrymandering context.  That, the plurality 
concluded, was just wrong.  For one thing, “in the racial gerrymandering 
 
152. Id. 
153. The plurality prefaced its assessment of the standards proposed in the three dissents “with 
the observation that the mere fact that these four dissenters come up with three different standards—
all of them different from the two proposed in Bandemer and the one proposed here by appellants—
goes a long way to establishing that there is no constitutionally discernible standard.”  Id.  I will 
argue that a proper understanding of the conceptual structure of constitutional doctrine suggests that 
this is very much mistaken.  The four dissenters, the lone concurrence, six Justices in Bandemer, 
and the appellants—indeed, even the plurality itself—actually discerned much the same 
“constitutional standard.”  The constitutionally discernible standard on which they all centered was 
a prohibition against the pursuit of excessive partisan advantage in redistricting.  The Vieth 
dissenters differed among themselves, and with the Bandemer plurality and dissent, principally 
concerning what test courts should create in order to administer that constitutionally discernible 
standard.  And even here the Vieth dissenters were disagreeing over what judicial test would be 
optimal, not over what would be adequate.  See supra note 125. 
154. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting Brief for Appellants, supra note 118, at 19 (emphasis in 
Vieth)) (plurality opinion). 
155. Id. at 1784 (quoting Brief for Appellants, supra note 118, at 20) (plurality opinion). 
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context, the predominant intent test has been applied to the challenged 
district in which the plaintiffs voted.”156  But the Vieth plaintiffs proposed 
their test as a way to challenge a statewide redistricting plan, not the 
placement of lines within a particular district.157  According to the plurality, 
this was a defect, not a virtue. 
Vague as the “predominant motivation” test might be when used to 
evaluate single districts, it all but evaporates when applied statewide.  
Does it mean, for instance, that partisan intent must outweigh all other 
goals—contiguity, compactness, preservation of neighborhoods, 
etc.—statewide?  And how is the statewide “outweighing” to be 
determined?158 
Moreover, “Even within the narrower compass of challenges to a single 
district, applying a ‘predominant intent’ test to racial gerrymandering is 
easier and less disruptive.”159  This is because “the purpose of segregating 
voters on the basis of race” is rare and unlawful, whereas the purpose of 
segregating them for partisan advantage is common and—when not pursued 
in “excess”—lawful.160  Given this difference, “to the extent that our racial 
gerrymandering cases represent a model of discernible and manageable 
standards, they provide no comfort here.”161 
 
156. Id. at 1780 (plurality opinion). 
157. Id. at 1773 (plurality opinion). 
158. Id. at 1781 (plurality opinion). 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id.  Although I have tried to present the plurality’s argument concerning the infirmities of 
plaintiffs’ intent prong, it must be said that this part of the plurality’s analysis is unusually 
muddled—extraordinarily so for a Scalia opinion.  What is clear is that, according to the plurality, 
the intentions to segregate voters on the bases of race and of partisan affiliation differ in the two 
ways I have described—that the former is rare and unlawful, whereas the latter (if not taken to an 
extreme) is common and lawful.  Now, this claim is at least doubly contestable—on the empirical 
claim that an intention to segregate voters on the basis of race is rare and on the interpretive claim 
that the intent to pursue only moderate partisan advantage is constitutionally permissible.  Those 
quibbles aside, what is really unclear is how this observation is supposed to bear upon whether the 
proposed intent prong is judicially manageable.  Here is the plurality’s reasoning on this score in its 
entirety: 
[1] Determining whether the shape of a particular district is so substantially affected by 
the presence of a rare and constitutionally suspect motive as to invalidate it is quite 
different from determining whether it is so substantially affected by the excess of an 
ordinary and lawful motive as to invalidate it.  [2] Moreover, the fact that partisan 
districting is a lawful and common practice means that there is almost always room for 
an election-impeding lawsuit contending that partisan advantage was the predominant 
motivation; not so for claims of racial gerrymandering. [3] Finally, courts might be 
justified in accepting a modest degree of unmanageability to enforce a constitutional 
command which (like the Fourteenth Amendment obligation to refrain from racial 
discrimination) is clear; whereas they are not justified in inferring a judicially 
enforceable constitutional obligation (the obligation not to apply too much partisanship 
in districting) which is both dubious and severely unmanageable. [4] For these reasons, 
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In the plurality’s eyes, the plaintiffs’ effects prong fares no better.  It is 
not “judicially discernible in the sense of being relevant to some 
constitutional violation” because it “rests upon the principle that groups (or at 
least political-action groups) have a right to proportional representation.”162  
And it’s not judicially manageable because it is “impossible to assess the 
effects of partisan gerrymandering,”163 difficult to establish whether a party 
has “majority status,”164 and “impossible to assure” that a party that does 
enjoy majority status “wins a majority of seats.”165 
 
to the extent that our racial gerrymandering cases represent a model of discernible and 
manageable standards, they provide no comfort here. 
Id. (bracketed numbers added).  Sentence [4] claims that the plurality has provided several reasons 
in support of its claim that differences between race and partisanship argue against adopting a 
predominant intent test in the latter context.  But has it?  And, if so, are those reasons persuasive? 
 Clearly, the plurality does supply a reason in sentence [2]: Because a purpose to secure partisan 
advantage is more common than is a purpose to segregate voters on account of race, a judicial test 
that looks to the former is likely to produce more litigation and to prove more disruptive.  Yet this 
reason is doubly questionable.  First, the history of post-Shaw litigation suggests that plaintiffs can 
very often muster a racial gerrymandering claim.  Second, even to the extent that the factual 
predicate holds true, it’s very far from clear that this is the sort of consideration that properly bears 
upon the manageability question.  See infra note 198 and accompanying text.  So I think that the 
reason contained in sentence [2] is not very persuasive.  But, to reiterate, a reason it is.  Are there 
others? 
 Surely the introductory word of sentence [2] implies that a reason has appeared in sentence [1] 
too.  But it has not.  Sentence [1] is actually devoid of reason; it is just a restatement of the claimed 
distinctions conjoined to the assertion that they make the inquiries “quite different.”  Sentence [3] 
also contains a reason.  But it is the wrong sort of reason.  That the obligation to refrain from racial 
discrimination is clearer than is the obligation not to apply too much partisanship in districting 
might be a reason to tolerate more unmanageability when adjudicating the former than the latter.  
But the unmanageability of the proposed “predominant intent to achieve partisan advantage” 
standard is precisely what sentence [3] is advertised as helping to demonstrate.  Justice Stevens is 
therefore right to label this reasoning “tautological.”  Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1804 n.13 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  Beyond its circularity, it is puzzling.  The claim that “the obligation not to apply too 
much partisanship in districting” is “dubious” sits uncomfortably with the plurality’s repeated 
recognition that the Constitution does indeed impose just such an obligation.  See infra note 192. 
162. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1782 (plurality opinion). 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 1783 (plurality opinion).  Unfortunately, here too the plurality’s analysis leaves 
much to be desired.  To start, pieces of the plurality’s critique fail to persuade even on their own 
terms.  Recall that the effects prong of the plaintiffs’ test would require a showing that the 
challenged scheme systematically packs and cracks a plaintiff’s party and that, as a result, the 
scheme prevents that party from winning a majority of seats even if it wins a majority of the votes 
statewide.  Id. at 1780–81 (plurality opinion).  In response, the plurality suggests that courts are 
unable to determine whether there is systematic packing and cracking because “a person’s politics is 
rarely . . . readily discernible” and “not an immutable characteristic.”  Id. at 1782 (plurality 
opinion).  Of course a person’s politics is not immutable.  But the argument as a whole—that 
packing and cracking cannot be discerned—can hardly be taken seriously.  As Justice Souter 
objected, the noncontroversial fact that partisan gerrymandering is widespread indicates that 
legislators have significant faith in their ability to discern a person’s politics.  See id. at 1817 n.2 
(Souter, J., dissenting).  Furthermore, as Rick Pildes has smartly observed, the posture of naivete 
that Scalia assumes here contrasts markedly with his more realistic recognition, in McConnell v. 
FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003), that “the effects of political practices should be gauged against the 
assumption that political behavior is rationally self-interested.”  Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme 
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Scalia applies similar criticisms to the three different approaches that 
were floated by the dissenters.  Justice Stevens’s test failed essentially 
because he, like the plaintiffs, erroneously assumed that because a judicial 
inquiry into predominant intent is manageable in racial gerrymandering 
cases, a similar inquiry is therefore manageable in partisan gerrymandering 
cases.166  Justice Souter’s five-part test is criticized on the ground “that each 
of the last four steps requires a quantifying judgment that is unguided and ill 
suited to the development of judicial standards.”167  More fundamentally, 
Souter’s proposal “is doomed to failure” because “[n]o test—yea, not even a 
five-part test—can possibly be successful unless one knows what he is 
testing.”168  And yet Souter does not make clear “the precise constitutional 
deprivation his test is designed to identify and prevent,”169 offering only the 
“flabby goal” of preventing “an extremity of unfairness.”170  Thus, even if 
 
Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 29, 65 (2004) [hereinafter Pildes, Democratic Politics]. 
 More fundamentally, though, the plurality’s objections rest on a misapprehension of the 
plaintiffs’ proposal.  The plaintiffs’ core claim, as I read it, is that “[a]ny party that earns a majority 
of the vote should have at least a fighting chance to become the governing party, with a majority of 
seats.”  Reply Brief for Appellants at 5, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004) (No. 02-1580) 
(emphasis added); see also Brief for Appellants, supra note 118, at 25.  To operationalize this idea, 
plaintiffs then proposed a complex and sophisticated methodology consisting of several discrete 
steps: (1) identifying all the statewide races contested by the major parties over the past decade 
(e.g., races for president, senators, governor, secretary of state, comptroller general, and the like); 
(2) determining for each race the percentage of votes won by each party’s candidate, and thus the 
percentage increase (decrease) in votes that each losing (winning) candidate of the out party would 
have needed in order to have won a bare majority of votes; (3) normalizing each election to simulate 
an outcome in which the out-party candidate would have won a bare majority of votes, by applying 
that percentage increase (or decrease) to his vote total in each district that comprises the challenged 
scheme; and (4) counting the number of districts in which the candidate for the out party would 
have won a majority of votes in that simulated election.  The Vieth plaintiffs then claimed that if 
performing this methodology for every statewide election would yield only a trivially small number 
of elections for which it would be true that the out-party candidate with a bare (50.1%) majority of 
the vote would have won a majority of the votes in at least half of the districts, then it is fair to 
conclude that the in party would have “lock[ed] up a majority of seats even if the other party 
overtakes it in popular support . . . .”  Id. at 35 (emphasis added). 
 Certainly, parts of the plaintiffs’ test can be reasonably challenged.  For example, one might 
deny the initial majoritarian premise.  Or, one might question the normalizing assumption by which 
the same percentage increase in votes is allocated to each district.  But my goal here is not to assess 
the overall wisdom or feasibility of the plaintiffs’ proposal.  Worth noting for present purposes is 
only that the particular objections leveled by the plurality are misconceived.  The plaintiffs’ 
approach never requires a court to determine whether any given party does in fact have “majority 
status” in the state; does not argue that if a party were to possess majority status, it must be 
guaranteed a majority of seats; and, by endorsing the so-called “seats bonus” (often called the 
winner’s bonus), expressly disavows the principle that any groups have a right to proportional 
representation.  See Reply Brief for Appellants, supra, at 7–8; Brief for Appellants, supra note 118, 
at 34. 
166. See Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1785 (plurality opinion). 
167. Id. at 1787 (plurality opinion). 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 1788 (plurality opinion). 
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Souter’s five steps “could be manageably applied,” the plurality saw “no 
reason to think they would detect the constitutional crime.”171  Justice 
Breyer’s dissent receives some approval from the plurality, which is not 
surprising given that Breyer, alone among the dissenters, takes pains to insist 
that some pursuit of partisan advantage is constitutional.  Also not surprising, 
though, is the plurality’s conclusion that Breyer’s analysis provides little 
guidance for courts in determining when “unjustified entrenchment” has 
occurred.172 
On the basis of this extended analysis, the plurality concluded that “no 
judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political 
gerrymandering claims have emerged.”173  As a result, “we must conclude 
that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and that Bandemer 
was wrongly decided.”174 
3. The Concurrence.—In effect, Justice Kennedy agreed with this first 
statement—that no judicially manageable standards have yet emerged—but 
disagreed with the second—that the failure of an acceptable standard to 
appear thus far justified a conclusion that none could emerge within an 
acceptable timeframe. 
According to Kennedy, courts confront “two obstacles” when seeking to 
adjudicate claims of partisan gerrymandering.175  “First is the lack of 
comprehensive and neutral principles for drawing electoral boundaries.”176  
Not only is there no present agreement on a “substantive definition of 
fairness in districting,”177 there is also a lack of “helpful discussions on the 
principles of fair districting discussed in the annals of parliamentary or 
legislative bodies.”178  The second obstacle, related to the first, “is the 
absence of rules to limit and confine judicial intervention.”179  Given the 
absence, thus far, of “agreed upon substantive principles of fairness in 
districting,” the courts are left with “no basis on which to define clear, 
manageable, and politically neutral standards for measuring the particular 
burden a given partisan classification imposes on representational rights.”180 
Agreeing with the plurality that no tests yet proposed have overcome 
these obstacles, Kennedy would have dismissed the challenge for failure to 
 
171. Id. at 1786 (plurality opinion). 
172. Id. at 1788 (plurality opinion). 
173. Id. at 1778 (plurality opinion). 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 1794 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
179. Id. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
180. Id. 
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state a claim.181  And he acknowledged that the more extreme conclusion—
that claims of partisan gerrymandering should be held nonjusticiable—“may 
prevail in the long run.”182  But, unlike the plurality, he was not prepared to 
reach that conclusion just yet. 
For one thing, pessimism that a manageable standard might emerge was 
premature.  The fact, heavily relied upon by the plurality, that no adequate 
standard has emerged since Bandemer, means little because “during these 
past 18 years the lower courts could do no more than follow” Bandemer.183  
Besides, “by the timeline of the law 18 years is rather a short period.”184  All 
the more so because claims of partisan gerrymandering had generally relied 
most heavily on the Equal Protection Clause.  But, Kennedy observed, the 
First Amendment might prove to be the “more relevant constitutional 
provision.”185 
Yet more fundamentally, Kennedy showed himself to be more sensitive 
to the grotesque affront to democratic principles that extreme partisan 
gerrymandering represents, and less sanguine that the practice could be 
meaningfully limited without judicial intervention.  Ironically, just as the 
 
181. Id. at 1796–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Although no doubt happy to receive Kennedy’s 
vote, the plurality nonetheless objected that dismissal was not a disposition available to him: “It is 
logically impossible to affirm [the district court’s] dismissal without either (1) finding that the 
unconstitutional-districting standard applied by the District Court, or some other standard that it 
should have applied, has not been met, or (2) finding (as we have) that the claim is nonjusticiable.” 
Id. at 1790 (plurality opinion). 
 I believe that the plurality is correct that Kennedy ought not to have dismissed the complaint for 
failure to state a claim.  True, given Kennedy’s flirtation with the First Amendment as a possible 
basis for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims, see infra note 185 and accompanying text, I 
suppose he could have rejoined that he aims to leave open hope only under that constitutional 
provision and agrees with the plurality that the Equal Protection Clause does not provide the basis 
for justiciable claims of partisan gerrymandering.  Cf. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, 
Where to Draw the Line? Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 543 
(2004) (arguing that “no matter how difficult judicial review of political gerrymandering claims 
may be . . . the overall doctrinal structure governing redistricting makes it impossible actually to 
render such claims nonjusticiable”).  Had the plaintiffs not pleaded the First Amendment, 
affirmance of the district court’s dismissal would have been appropriate.  I am not myself 
sympathetic to this provision-by-provision approach to justiciability.  In any event, the plaintiffs did 
plead the First Amendment, and Kennedy did not take this route, so the gist of his response to the 
plurality on this score, see Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1797 (Kennedy, J., concurring), is not entirely clear. 
 Kennedy’s better response might have been to challenge the plurality’s insistence that he was 
duty-bound to supply a standard.  At the heart of Kennedy’s opinion is the judgment that it is the 
plaintiffs’ burden to persuade the court that the Constitution has been violated, and that they have 
not done this.  On this (admittedly ad hoc) approach, decision for the state defendant would have 
been proper, but it would have been a decision on the merits, not a dismissal for failure to state a 
claim. 
182. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1794 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
183. Id. at 1796 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 1797 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“After all, these allegations involve the First 
Amendment interest of not burdening or penalizing citizens because of their participation in the 
electoral process, their voting history, their association with a political party, or their expression of 
political views.”). 
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plurality had criticized Breyer’s opinion for failing to undertake any cost-
benefit analysis concerning whether judicial intervention is justified,186 
Kennedy’s disagreement with the plurality can be seen as a charge that the 
plurality also failed to take the relevant costs into account.  But whereas the 
plurality thought Breyer ignored the costs of judicial intervention, Kennedy 
charged the plurality with understating the costs of judicial abdication. 
“The ordered working of our Republic, and of the democratic process, 
depends on a sense of decorum and restraint in all branches of government, 
and in the citizenry itself,” he wrote.187  And the Pennsylvania legislature’s 
abandonment of that restraint, he continued, “should not be thought to serve 
the interests of our political order.  Nor should it be thought to serve our 
interest in demonstrating to the world how democracy works.”188  Although 
he, like the plurality, voted to uphold the Pennsylvania partisan gerrymander 
for want of a manageable standard, Kennedy explicitly left open hope for the 
future.  “If workable standards do emerge,” he insisted, “courts should be 
prepared to order relief.”189 
II. Two Problems of Manageability 
Although Vieth could be read to introduce ever more confusion to 
partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence,190 in one key respect it brought more 
light.  For the first time,191 all the Justices agreed that the pursuit of partisan 
 
186. Justice Breyer had recognized that several avenues of redress may be available for a 
majority to prevent minority entrenchment—the governor, redistricting commissions, Congress, and 
the people via ballot initiatives and referenda.  Id. at 1826 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Because of this, 
the plurality pointed out, the cost of judicial inaction might not be great.  Accordingly, it argued, 
Breyer should have attended to the costs of action.  And these, the plurality contended were 
substantial, for “court action that is available tends to be sought, not just where it is necessary, but 
where it is in the interest of the seeking party.  And the vaguer the test for availability, the more 
frequently interest rather than necessity will produce litigation.”  Id. at 1789 (plurality opinion).  
The plurality concluded that “the regular insertion of the judiciary into districting, with the delay 
and uncertainty that brings to the political process and the partisan enmity it brings upon the courts” 
was not “worth the benefit to be achieved—an accelerated (by some unknown degree) effectuation 
of the majority will.”  Id. at 1789 (plurality opinion). 
187. Id. at 1798 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 1799 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
190. Cf.  J. Clark Kelso, United States Supreme Court Case Preview: Vieth v. Jubelirer: 
Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 3 ELECTION L.J. 47, 50 (2004) (noting that “forecasting 
a result [in Vieth] is hopeless,” but identifying as one “real possibility” that the case would produce 
“a split decision that leaves the law either unchanged or even less certain than it is now”). 
191. In his Vieth dissent, Justice Stevens announced that “our opinions referring to political 
gerrymanders have consistently assumed that they were at least undesirable, and we always have 
indicated that political considerations are among those factors that may not dominate districting 
decisions.”  Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1811 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  But the cases he cites in support of 
that claim—Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Fortson v. 
Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965)—do not strictly bear it out, for all involved decisions to resort to 
multi-member districts, not the decisions of how to draw the lines separating single-member 
districts.  Moreover, the lead case in the series, Fortson, specifically left as an open question the 
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advantage in redistricting is sometimes unconstitutional.192  Also, all justices 
agreed that whether the relevant constitutional prohibition should be 
judicially enforced depends, at least in part, on whether the Court can craft a 
judicially manageable standard.193 
The central question that divided the Court in Vieth is the same issue 
that has confounded the judicial response to partisan gerrymandering since 
Bandemer and, indirectly, since Colegrove: whether the courts can develop 
manageable standards for policing the practice.  But as Kennedy’s 
concurrence rightly argues, the problem of manageability is really two 
analytically distinct problems, not one.194  Unfortunately, as I will argue 
below, the precise way in which Kennedy conceptualizes the first of the two 
problems risks obscuring as much as it illuminates.  But his core claim that 
there are two problems remains of critical importance.  All members of Vieth 
agreed that some forms of partisan gerrymandering are unconstitutional.  We 
cannot hope for progress in crafting judicially manageable standards for 
curbing the practice until we carefully tease apart the twin elements that 
comprise the manageability challenge.195 
 
constitutionality of a multi-member districting scheme that “operate[s] to minimize or cancel out the 
voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.”  Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439. 
192. See, e.g., Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1785 (plurality opinion) (implying agreement with the 
proposition that “severe partisan gerrymanders [are incompatible] with democratic principles” and 
“violate the Constitution”); id. (acknowledging that an “excessive injection of politics [into 
districting] is unlawful”); id. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that redistricting violates 
the Constitution when a state applies political “classifications . . . in an invidious manner or in a 
way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective”); id. at 1798 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(agreeing with the plurality that “partisan gerrymandering that disfavors one party is [not] 
permissible”); id. at 1810 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that “partisanship [can] be a permissible 
consideration in drawing district lines, so long as it does not predominate”); id. at 1815 (Souter, J., 
dissenting joined by Ginsburg, J.) (acknowledging “that some intent to gain political advantage is 
inescapable whenever political bodies devise a district plan” and describing the equal protection 
issue as “one of how much [partisanship] is too much”); id. at 1824–25 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that “the legislature’s use of political boundary drawing considerations ordinarily does not 
violate the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause,” but that there are circumstances “where use of 
purely political boundary-drawing factors can amount to a serious, and remediable, abuse”) 
(emphasis in original). 
193. But see Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 181 (manuscript at 21) (observing rightly that, 
although the plurality opinion ultimately rested only on the manageability prong of Baker, “it began 
with an intriguing feint in the direction of treating gerrymandering claims as nonjusticiable” on 
Baker’s textually demonstrable commitment prong). 
194. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[W]hen presented with a claim of 
injury from partisan gerrymandering, courts confront two obstacles.  First is the lack of 
comprehensive and neutral principles for drawing electoral boundaries . . . .  Second is the absence 
of rules to limit and confine judicial intervention.”). 
195. Rick Hasen likewise observes that “the judicial manageability debate in Vieth conflates 
two separate concerns.” Rick Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan 
Gerrymandering Claims after Vieth 5 (July 2004) (unpublished manuscript on file with Texas Law 
Review).  But he describes these two concerns as “one about consistency of result across the courts 
and a second about the justifiability of a standard for judging partisan gerrymandering claims.”  Id.  
The twin concerns on which I will focus (and which I do not think Vieth fully conflates) involve, 
first, the elucidation of excessive partisanship as a matter of constitutional meaning and, second, the 
manageability of judicial doctrine crafted to administer that meaning. 
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I have just said that all members of the Vieth Court acknowledged that 
pursuit of partisan aims in redistricting violates the Constitution under some 
circumstances.  They acknowledged as well that the challenge is to craft a 
manageable standard for enforcing the constitutional prohibition.196  But my 
claim that this challenge is comprised of two analytically distinct 
components does not hold true for all views of the circumstances under 
which partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional.  We can get a better grasp 
on the nature of the discrete tasks by understanding why this is so. 
The most important difference of opinion concerning what constitutes 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering is this: For many members of the 
Court, some recourse to partisanship in districting is constitutional; the 
Constitution forbids only that pursuit of partisan advantage which is 
excessive or otherwise improper.  For Justice Stevens, in contrast, any 
pursuit of partisan advantage in redistricting is unconstitutional.197 
For one who holds Stevens’s view, the problem of manageability really 
does present just one challenge: the judiciary must articulate a standard or 
test that permits courts to adjudicate this rather clear principle in a 
“manageable” fashion.  Now, the criteria that bear upon whether given 
doctrine is manageable are not self-evident.  Surely not all respects in which 
proposed constitutional doctrine might be considered defective count against 
that doctrine’s “manageability.”  After all, “unmanageable” is not 
synonymous with “unwise” or “imprudent” or “undesirable, all things 
considered.”  Yet Justices have disagreed concerning precisely which of the 
many sorts of features that might render doctrine suboptimal count against 
that doctrine’s “manageability.”198  And if there is no consensus regarding 
the sorts of defects that count in the manageability calculus at all (and 
because manageability is a continuum concept not a binary one), so much 
 
196. See, e.g., Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1777–79 (plurality opinion) (pointing out that since “there are 
yet no agreed upon substantive principles of fairness in districting, we have no basis on which to 
define clear, manageable, and politically neutral standards for measuring the particular burden a 
given partisan classification imposes on representational rights”). 
197. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1801 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
198. See, for example, supra note 104.  That given doctrine is likely to produce unpredictable 
and inconsistent results are paradigmatic considerations that bear upon its “manageability.”  Not so, 
it seems to me, that the doctrine either generates interbranch friction because it often results in 
judicial holdings that the state acted unconstitutionally, or provokes substantial litigation by overly 
optimistic plaintiffs.  This is not to contend that judges may not take these factors into account when 
crafting doctrine.  Whether they may is an important and challenging question.  See Berman, 
Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 18, at 88–100.  My point here is only to question whether 
these sorts of flaws are the sorts of flaws that count against the doctrine’s “manageability” and that 
are therefore properly taken into account for purposes of deciding whether a claim raises a 
nonjusticiable political question.  For a like recognition that Baker’s “judicially manageable 
standards” criterion is not intended to cover the full range of respects in which judicial standards 
might be thought nonideal, but is instead “focused firmly on the Court’s ability to do a good job 
deciding the case,” see Sanford Levinson & Ernest A. Young, Who’s Afraid of the Twelfth 
Amendment?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925, 957 (2001). 
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more certainly will Justices and judges disagree over whether a particular 
proposed doctrine presents the relevant sorts of defects, or threatens the 
relevant sorts of unfortunate consequences, to sufficient degree to warrant 
labeling that doctrine unmanageable (rather than, say, “manageable enough, 
though less manageable than we’d like”).  Notwithstanding these important 
caveats, however, for those who believe that the Constitution prohibits any 
pursuit of partisan advantage in redistricting, the heart of the manageability 
challenge is easy to grasp: we need an in-court test, rule, or standard that 
does an adequate job of catching those cases in which partisanship has been 
present, without relying upon too much judicial subjectivity in application 
and generating too much unpredictability and instability (or, perhaps, 
producing other kindred ills). 
Things are different for those—a majority in Vieth—who believe that 
pursuit of partisan advantage is constitutionally permissible so long as it is 
not “excessive.”199  Like Justice Stevens, they must be able to meet what we 
might call the challenge of manageability proper: they must articulate a 
judicial decisional procedure that is not so indeterminate as to make results in 
partisan gerrymandering cases “disparate and inconsistent.”200  But adherents 
of the view that partisanship in redistricting becomes unconstitutional only 
when excessive confront a challenge that Justice Stevens does not: they must 
provide some content or meaning to the wholly vague notion of “excessive 
partisanship.”201 
 
199. In Cox v. Larios, 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004), a post-Vieth case in which the Court summarily 
affirmed a lower court judgment that Georgia’s state legislative reapportionment violated one 
person, one vote, Justice Scalia observed that every Justice in Vieth, save Stevens, agreed that the 
pursuit of partisan advantage in redistricting is permissible “so long as it does not go too far.”  Id. at 
2809 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
200. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
201. I take this point to be comparable, but possibly not identical, to Kennedy’s reference to the 
need for a “subsidiary standard.”  Id. at 1797 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Heather K. 
Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 
N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1413–14 (2002) (explaining that implementing Baker required the Court to 
settle on a “mediating” principle or theory to give content to the foundational norm of equality that 
Baker endorsed).  Compare, as well, Keith Whittington’s distinction between constitutional 
interpretation and constitutional construction.  See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); 
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL 
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999).  We might say that, having interpreted the Constitution to 
prohibit excessive partisanship, the Court ought then to develop a construction of that interpreted 
meaning. 
 Closer to home, Backstrom, Robins, and Eller distinguish two concepts that are involved in the 
judicial quest to police partisan gerrymandering—measures and standards: 
   A measure is a device or method of detecting and calibrating disparities.  A standard 
is how great that disparity must be to constitute an inequity . . . or a discrimination . . . . 
   Thus in dealing with partisan gerrymandering, the Court will have to first adopt a 
measure to ascertain whether and to what degree a disparity is present, and then choose 
a standard of how much disparity is acceptable before a specific districting act will be 
overturned. 
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The plurality makes this point—that those adherents have not 
successfully accomplished this analytically primary task—when criticizing 
Justice Souter for skipping too quickly to offer his two-step, five-part test.  
Souter’s test is intended to cure the problems of subjectivity and 
indeterminacy.202  The plurality, recall, doubts that the test responds 
adequately even to those problems.  More fundamentally, however, they 
chastise Souter for proposing a test without first giving more concrete 
meaning to the notion of excessive partisanship: “No test—yea, not even a 
five-part test—can possibly be successful unless one knows what he is 
testing for.”203  The plurality is right.  A satisfactory test must not only avoid 
the evils of unconstrained discretion; it must also adequately fit the 
underlying violation.204  Without a clearer definition of excessive 
partisanship, we cannot know whether Souter’s test does a tolerable job of 
separating excessive partisanship from permissible partisanship.205 
This is Justice Kennedy’s point as well.  His appeal to some acceptable 
“substantive definition of fairness in districting” is best understood, I think, 
as a plea that meaning be given to the amorphous notion of “excessive 
partisanship.”206  Unfortunately, Kennedy’s suggestion that we need an 
understanding of fairness in districting to make meaningful the notion of 
excessive partisanship is mistaken.  We can give content or meaning to 
“excessive partisanship” without adopting a prior understanding of fairness.  
Indeed, Kennedy might have things exactly backwards: an understanding of 
what is a fair redistricting could be a function of an understanding of how 
much partisanship is excessive, not the reverse.  This would be so if what 
makes some degree of partisanship excessive is not the fact that it is 
inherently unfair but that it is likely to produce other sorts of ills, such as that 
it undermines democracy. 
The remainder of this Article assumes, as a majority of Justices in Vieth 
plainly have accepted, that a gerrymander is unconstitutional when it 
excessively pursues partisan advantage in districting.207  And it pursues, in 
 
Backstrom et al., supra note 114, at 159–60.  Although that is a useful distinction, the subject on 
which I aim to focus attention—what is meant by excessive partisanship—is conceptually prior to 
both measure and standard, as the authors employ those terms. 
202. See supra text accompanying notes 131–37. 
203. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1787 (plurality opinion). 
204. I recently argued that Commerce Clause doctrine would also benefit from greater judicial 
sensitivity to this lesson.  See Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing the Surface of 
Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1487, 1527–29 (2004) [hereinafter Berman, Guillen 
and Gullibility]. 
205. Indeed, it appears that Souter’s test is better designed to capture any partisanship than the 
subset of extreme or excessive partisanship. 
206. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1793 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
207. This is least clear in the case of Justice Breyer.  In arguing that it is unconstitutional for a 
party with minority popular support to entrench itself in power through partisan manipulation of 
district lines, Breyer left open whether partisan gerrymandering could be unconstitutional in other 
circumstances too.  My own view is that “unjustified entrenchment” of a minority party as a 
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three steps, a manageable standard for administering this constitutional 
principle.  This Part takes the first step by explaining that the notion of 
“excessive partisanship” is not only amorphous, but also ambiguous.208  That 
is, the effort to give content to the idea of excessive partisanship can take one 
in identifiably distinct directions.  This Part, accordingly, describes what 
might be meant, and what should be meant, by excessive pursuit of partisan 
advantage.209 
A. The Meanings of Excessive Partisanship 
If the Constitution prohibits “too much partisanship”210 in districting, it 
must permit some partisanship.211  It might seem to follow, as Justice Souter 
 
majority and “unjustified entrenchment” of a majority party as a supermajority are not meaningfully 
distinguishable as a constitutional matter.  For one thing, where congressional redistricting is at 
issue, majority-to-supermajority entrenchment at the state level can produce minority-to-majority 
entrenchment at the national level. 
 Second, even if we focus only at the state level, Breyer’s narrow concern with minority-to-
majority entrenchment seems not to adequately appreciate the feedback mechanism that can obtain 
between popular support and electoral success.  For example, the likelihood that a potential voter 
will cast a ballot is probably proportional, all things being equal, to her perception of the likelihood 
that her favored party will control the legislature.  Put otherwise, persons who are actual or potential 
supporters of a minority party are more energized and more likely to vote when they believe that 
becoming an electoral majority is possible.  Consequently, the fact that a party enjoys popular 
majority support at one point in time can itself be partly a function of the fact that, at an earlier point 
in time, it engaged in partisan manipulations to translate a bare electoral majority into an electoral 
supermajority. 
 For these reasons, I believe that the distinction between minority-to-majority entrenchment and 
majority-to-supermajority entrenchment that Breyer at least contemplates is not ultimately tenable.  
(And even were it a normatively attractive distinction as a matter of constitutional meaning, to 
embody the distinction in constitutional doctrine would only compound the manageability problem 
in cases of closely divided states—as my colleague Douglas Laycock has pointed out to me.)  
Accordingly, I will read Breyer’s dissent as expressing the following three-part view: that excessive 
partisanship in gerrymandering is unconstitutional; that one circumstance in which a partisan 
gerrymander is unconstitutionally excessive is when it results in unjustified entrenchment; and that 
the concept of excessive partisanship is otherwise underspecified at present. 
208. Rick Pildes has observed that “[l]aw and social science are perhaps nowhere more 
mutually dependent than in the voting-rights field.”  Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now 
at War with Itself?  Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1518 
(2002).  He may well be right; I don’t know.  The dependence has not, however, been an 
unmitigated good.  It has encouraged lawyers and legal scholars to argue first in terms of what is 
measurable without taking pains to ascertain what we would like to measure if we could. 
209. This strategy can also be read as a partial response to a telling criticism of Bandemer that 
Daniel Lowenstein leveled fifteen years ago.  See generally Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Bandemer’s 
Gap: Gerrymandering and Equal Protection, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, 
supra note 13, at 64.  Disagreeing with those who had attributed the confusion that had greeted the 
Supreme Court’s decision to the plurality’s failure “to lay down sufficiently clear ‘standards’ for the 
adjudication of gerrymandering cases,” id. at 65, Lowenstein diagnosed, as “[t]he true source of 
confusion in interpreting Bandemer,” the plurality’s provision of “an incomplete definition and 
explanation of the nature of the constitutional violation that may inhere in a partisan gerrymander.” 
Id. at 66.  “[R]ules or standards to govern matters of great complexity,” he further observed, “cannot 
be precise or comprehensive enough to give adequate guidance in particular cases without an 
explanation of the principles that those rules and standards are intended to implement.”  Id. at 67. 
210. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1815 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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observed and the plurality agreed, that “the issue is one of how much is too 
much.”212  And so it does.  But not immediately.  Before we can hope to 
identify and articulate even a remotely intelligent answer to Souter’s 
question, we will need a clearer grasp on what it means for partisanship to be 
present a lot rather than a little.  And for this, we will need to articulate a 
measure in which the partisanship of the scheme will be quantified, and we 
will need to identify a baseline against which the challenged districting 
scheme will be compared.  Each of these needs, I will propose, comes in two 
varieties: the measure can be (what we may inelegantly call) “cost-based” or 
“ends-based”; the baseline can be normative or positive.  Because the choices 
of measure and baseline are independent of each other, we are left with a 2 X 
2 matrix of possibilities for conceptualizing amounts of partisanship. 
This subpart argues that the usual ways of conceptualizing “too much 
partisanship” are misguided; in effect, judges and scholars have been looking 
in the wrong boxes of the matrix.  It then explains that the better concept and 
measure of too much partisanship consist of measuring an ends-based 
conceptualization against a positive baseline.  Correct conceptualization will 
put us in position to meet the plurality’s challenge to Justice Souter—i.e., to 
explicate what we’re testing for—without adopting an answer to that 
question as lenient as that accepted by Justice Stevens (any partisanship in 
districting) or as stringent as that at least entertained by Justice Breyer (only 
the use of partisanship to entrench a minority as a majority). 
1. Two Scalar Measures of Partisanship.—Although commentators 
often draw attention to the need for a baseline,213 the more fundamental, yet 
less obvious, need is to conceptualize partisanship in a way that is amenable 
to assessment in quantitative terms.  Put otherwise, we need to conceptualize 
partisanship as a scalar concept,214 so that it can be present in greater or lesser 
degree. 
It is fairly easy (though not entirely unproblematic) to conceptualize 
partisanship in binary terms, as present or absent.  Partisanship in 
 
211. This is open to quibble.  Literally speaking, one could maintain both that the Constitution 
prohibits too much partisanship and that any partisanship is too much.  But the more straightforward 
way to convey this idea is that the Constitution prohibits any partisanship in districting.  So I will 
stand by the statement in the text. 
212. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1815 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 1788 (plurality opinion). 
213. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 
85 GEO. L.J. 491, 542 (1997) (arguing that “judicial competence turns on the existence of an 
uncontroversial baseline against which to measure entrenchment effects”); Pildes, Democratic 
Politics, supra note 165, at 59 (“The difficulty for courts addressing gerrymandering has long been 
thought to be defining a baseline for what constitutes a party’s ‘proper’ share of political 
representation given the distribution of votes.”). 
214. Scalar measures are customarily distinguished from vectors, in possessing only magnitude, 
not direction as well.  Here, I am distinguishing scalars from binaries. 
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redistricting refers, first and foremost, to partisan motivation.215  So to ask 
whether partisanship lay behind any given redistricting is equivalent to 
asking whether the legislature216 drew district lines, or otherwise decided 
how the electoral system would be structured,217 with a purpose of promoting 
a favored party’s electoral chances.  In a mixed-motive case, we frequently 
conceptualize issues of this sort in but-for terms:218  Would the lines have 
been drawn just as they were drawn had the legislature not sought to promote 
the party’s electoral chances? 
But if partisan motivation was present,219 if the redistricter acted for the 
purpose of realizing partisan advantage, what does it mean for that 
motivation to be present more or less, a little or a lot?  Until we settle on an 
answer to this question, the ultimate issue that six Justices (the plurality plus 
Justices Souter and Ginsburg) explicitly identify as central—“how much is 
too much”—will be unanswerable. 
This point can hardly be overemphasized because there are at least two 
plausible ways to make sense of partisan motivation as a scalar concept.  
Partisanship in redistricting, recall, refers to a certain sort of purpose—a 
purpose to promote a favored party’s electoral prospects.  One way to think 
 
215. That is, when we speak of “partisanship” in redistricting, we are referring to the character 
of the purposes, motives, or intentions held by the actors responsible for the redistricting.  A 
partisan purpose or partisan motivation is an “intent to gain political advantage.”  Vieth, 124 S. Ct. 
at 1815 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1801 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that, for 
claims of gerrymandering, “purpose [is] the ultimate inquiry”); id. at 1788 (plurality opinion) 
(discussing “efforts to maximize partisan representation”).  To have a partisan purpose is to use, as a 
line-drawing “consideration,” predictions regarding the expected electoral success of a party’s 
candidates under different scenarios. 
216. Except where otherwise specified, I will assume that the redistricting authority is the 
legislature, so I speak interchangeably of “legislatures” and “redistricters.” 
217. Attention to the structure of the system and not only to the placement of district lines is 
necessary to accommodate such decisions as whether and where to replace single-member districts 
with multi-member districts.  But having flagged this wrinkle, I will now disregard it in what 
follows.  For ease of analysis and exposition I shall marginally simplify the problem of partisan 
gerrymandering by assuming that the redistricting decision consists of deciding where to locate the 
boundaries of single-member districts. 
218. Relying on but-for causation here produces familiar difficulties in cases of causal 
overdetermination, which I am content to put aside. 
219. We can say that partisan motivation was present, and causally efficacious, if the final 
product would not have been precisely as it was if the legislature had not been motivated, at all, by 
that purpose.  We could also say that partisan motivation was effective, or produced a partisan 
effect, if the final product did in fact result in the election of more members of the legislature’s 
preferred party than would likely have been elected had the partisan motivation not been present.  
Precisely because we could be concerned with whether the partisan motivation succeeded in 
achieving its partisan effects, we might not want to reduce partisanship in redistricting to partisan 
motivation alone.  This is why I say, above, that “partisanship in redistricting refers, first and 
foremost, to partisan motivation.” At the same time, to reduce the notion of partisanship in 
redistricting to partisan effects alone, without regard for partisan motivation, is to fundamentally 
misconceive the character of the phenomenon under investigation.  Here, then, is one rarely noted 
difference between malapportionment and gerrymandering: malapportionment is entirely a function 
of effects, gerrymandering is centrally about purposes. 
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about that purpose as being present in greater or lesser degree is cost-based.  
The amount, or weight, of partisanship at work is a function of what the 
redistricter has paid to realize its partisan goal.  And payment, in this context, 
is measured in terms of how much satisfaction of competing interests the 
legislature has willingly foregone to achieve its end.  The more that the 
redistricter has sacrificed for partisan advantage, the more partisanship it has 
exhibited.  A second and contrasting way to think about partisanship in 
quantitative terms is ends-based.  Under this conception, the measure of 
partisanship is supplied by the partisan advantage sought.  The greater the 
electoral advantage that the legislature has tried to secure, the greater its 
partisan motivation.220 
Choosing between the cost-based and ends-based conceptions of 
partisanship is necessary in order to supply content to the “how much” part 
of the ultimate issue on which Justices Souter and Scalia alike are focused— 
“How much partisanship is too much?”  For without settling on one or the 
other conceptualization, we have no basis for determining whether a given 
redistricting reflects a lot of partisan motivation or a little. 
To see that this is so, suppose that redistricters in State A, which is 
controlled by Party A, pursued only marginal partisan advantage—say, they 
tried to eke out only one more seat for their party221—but at substantial cost, 
as measured by the extent to which other values were sacrificed to this goal.  
That is, let us assume, the redistricters did value (or should have valued) 
compactness of districts and the integrity of political subdivisions, but ended 
up adopting a scheme that is very noncompact and slices through 
subdivisions right and left, all in order to pick up that marginal increase in 
seats—say, one.  In contrast, suppose that redistricters in State B, controlled 
by Party B, aim to satiate a large appetite for partisan gain.  And as it 
happens, the geographic and demographic characteristics of that state enable 
them to achieve their goal at little sacrifice to traditional districting criteria 
such as compactness or respect for political subdivisions.  The resulting map 
does not look odd, but it gives Party B many more seats. 
In sum, redistricters in State A pursued slight partisan ends at substantial 
cost.  Their counterparts in State B pursued substantial partisan ends at slight 
cost.  Which scheme exhibits or embodies more partisanship?  It depends.  
Until we self-consciously conceptualize partisanship in cost-based or ends-
based terms, we can’t know, even in principle, whether more partisanship 
affected redistricting in State A or in State B.  For this reason, adopting one 
 
220. In order for these two measures to be different, we must assume that the units of cost are 
not themselves defined by reference to the ends sought, namely seats-per-party.  This is, of course, a 
fair assumption in this context: some considerations other than partisan advantage do and should 
matter to redistricters. 
221. “‘Only one more seat’ than what?” you might wonder.  That will indeed be the next 
question.  See infra section II(A)(2). 
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or the other conception of partisanship is a necessary step to give content to 
the notion of excessive partisanship.222 
2. Two Baselines for Measurement.—It is not, however, sufficient.  The 
previous discussion speaks in terms of how many more seats the 
gerrymandering party obtained and the extent to which they sacrificed other 
considerations.  But in order to make sense of either notion, we need a 
baseline.  How many more seats than what?  From what starting point do we 
assess the magnitude of any sacrifice? 
The gerrymandering literature supplies a common answer: 
unconstitutionally excessive partisanship is reliance on partisanship that 
departs too far from what fairness dictates.  As my colleague Sandy Levinson 
put it, “[J]udicial intervention with regard to gerrymandering will require 
analysis of the substantive fairness of representation . . . .”223  This is a 
normative baseline.  Starting with some notion of what, ideally, the 
legislature should have done, proponents of this approach ask whether what 
the legislature actually did departs too far from this normative ideal.  The 
alternative is to measure the actual plan against a non-normative, or positive, 
standard.  Such a positive baseline could take a variety of forms.  In theory, 
for example, it could be constituted by what the legislature of some actual or 
hypothetical State C would have done, or what the plaintiff’s attorneys 
propose.  It seems to me, however, that the most sensible positive baseline is 
counterfactual—what the actual redistricters would have done had they not 
been motivated at all to achieve partisan outcomes.224  Accordingly, and at 
the admitted risk of some oversimplification, the following analysis contrasts 
 
222. At the urging of Micah Altman, let me make clear that neither the cost-based nor the ends-
based conception would capture the redistricters’ utility function with respect to tradeoffs between 
seat and nonseat districting considerations. 
223. Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional 
Representation: Why Won’t It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 257, 281 (1985); see also Pildes, 
Democratic Politics, supra note 165, at 66 (noting that common view that, “if the Court is going to 
rule excessive partisan gerrymandering unconstitutional, it must first be able to specify a fair 
partisan distribution of districts”). 
224. The most familiar of such “positive baseline” approaches would measure the expected 
partisan consequences of the actual plan against the outcomes that could be expected under 
randomly generated plans.  For a proposal of this sort, see Richard L. Engstrom, The Supreme Court 
and Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair and Effective 
Representation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 316–18; for criticisms, see Daniel H. Lowenstein & 
Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or 
Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 56–62 (1985), and Richard G. Niemi, The Relationship Between 
Votes and Seats: The Ultimate Question in Political Gerrymandering, 33 UCLA L. REV. 185, 207–
08 (1985).  Relatedly, one commentator has proposed that redistricting plans be measured for 
excessive partisanship against the baseline of what a hypothetical bipartisan commission would 
have done.  Michael E. Lewyn, How To Limit Gerrymandering, 45 FLA. L. REV. 403 (1993).  These 
formulations might constitute useful proxies for the counterfactual baseline, but do not otherwise 
have much to recommend them, I think.  Their possible value as heuristics will be considered infra 
subpart IV(A). 
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the normative baseline with the counterfactual one, rather than with the more 
generic positive baseline. 
Because each of the two measures of partisanship set forth in the 
previous section could be measured against both counterfactual (positive) 
and normative baselines, we are left with four distinct ways—each of which 
is quantitatively sensitive—to conceptualize partisanship in redistricting.  
These different conceptions do not, I reiterate, specifically address the 
question of how much partisanship is “too much”; they speak to the 
analytically prior question of how to understand how much partisanship there 
has been.225  (See Table.) 
 
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF PARTISANSHIP IN REDISTRICTING 
 Normative Baseline Counterfactual Baseline 
Cost-based Measure 2 3 
Ends-based Measure 1 4 
 
The amount of partisanship present under a cost-based, counterfactual-
baseline conception (Box 3) is determined by asking: Compared to the 
considerations that the redistricters would have employed, and thus 
compared to the state of the world that the redistricters would have brought 
about had they not considered party advantage at all, to what extent were 
those considerations and outcomes226 sacrificed in the actually adopted 
redistricting scheme?  The amount of partisanship at work under a cost-
based, normative-baseline conception (Box 2) is determined by asking the 
nearly identical question, replacing “would” with “should”: Compared to the 
considerations that the redistricters should have employed, and thus 
compared to the state of the world that the redistricters should have brought 
about had they not considered party advantage at all, to what extent were 
those considerations and outcomes sacrificed in the actually adopted 
redistricting scheme? 
An ends-based, normative-baseline view (Box 1) conceptualizes amount 
of partisanship as a function of the number of seats the redistricting party 
expects under its adopted plan compared to the number of seats it should 
 
225. Readers familiar with the partisan gerrymandering literature may discern some points of 
similarity between these four conceptions and the common trichotomy among “formal,” “result-
oriented,” and “process-oriented” gerrymandering criteria.  See Bruce E. Cain, Simple vs. Complex 
Criteria for Partisan Gerrymandering: A Comment on Niemi and Grofman, 33 UCLA L. REV. 213, 
214 (1985).  Any resemblance is only superficial.  I am classifying ways to conceptualize how much 
partisanship is present in any given redistricting scheme.  I am not yet attending to what the 
judicially manageable test should be.  The districting criteria that law professors and political 
scientists discuss, taxonomize, and critique are often proposed as full or partial answers to that 
analytically distinct and logically subsequent question. 
226. By “outcomes,” here and later in this paragraph, I mean mostly formal features like levels 
of average district compactness, not electoral outcomes. 
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receive or to which it is entitled.  Lastly, an ends-based, counterfactual-
baseline conception (Box 4) measures partisanship in terms of the number of 
seats the redistricting party expects under its adopted plan compared to the 
number of seats it would have expected had it not pursued partisan ends. 
This effort to identify the range of distinct ways in which partisanship 
can be intelligibly conceptualized in scalar terms is not a scholastic exercise.  
It provides a powerful framework for critically assessing extant judicial and 
scholarly arguments that purport to show that the judiciary could not 
manageably police the practice of partisan gerrymandering.  The framework 
will show that the conclusion does not follow from the arguments because 
critics almost universally focus their fire on only one of these four 
conceptions of excessive partisanship without recognizing the availability of 
others. 
B. Three Wrong Turns 
1. The Specter of Proportional Representation.—The particular 
normative baseline most frequently discussed in the gerrymandering 
literature is supplied by principles of proportional representation.227  
According to this view, the ideally fair scheme of electoral representation 
would apportion seats in proportion to the parties’ respective shares of the 
votes cast.  Some departure from this ideal can be permitted.  But it is 
unconstitutional for a redistricting plan to depart too far from proportionality 
in pursuit of partisan gain. 
As Justice O’Connor’s Bandemer concurrence exemplifies,228 the notion 
that we can make sense of unconstitutionally partisan gerrymandering only 
by measuring a challenged scheme against the baseline of proportional 
representation is frequently affirmed by those who would declare claims of 
partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable.229  Simply put, they argue, regardless 
of whether proportional representation is an attractive electoral system—and 
political scientists are increasingly divided on the question—it is not a 
system with constitutional credentials.  Nothing in our constitutional text or 
history supports the judgment that states act unconstitutionally by creating 
voting mechanisms and district lines that produce wholly disproportional 
representation. 
Tellingly, it is hard to find a dissenter.  Those who argue that some 
forms of partisanship in districting are unconstitutional, and should be 
justiciable, rarely explicitly propose proportional representation as the 
standard against which challenged schemes can be measured for 
 
227. See, e.g., Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 224, at 52 (“The most popular conception of 
how votes and seats in legislative elections should be related is that they should be proportional.”). 
228. See supra text accompanying note 97. 
229. See, e.g., Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 224, at 15. 
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constitutionality and often take great pains to insist otherwise.230  But their 
opponents often contend that they have no alternative.  As Peter Schuck has 
argued, “[C]ourts attempting to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims 
will find it impossible to vindicate those claims unless they adopt a 
proportional representation standard.”231 
Our taxonomy of conceptualizations reveals that this is not so.  A model 
of excessive partisanship that is conceptually dependent upon the ideal of 
proportional representation falls in Box 1: it is an ends-based conception 
measured against a normative baseline.232  Accordingly, the generally 
accepted proposition that no party or community is constitutionally entitled 
to proportionate representation in the legislature—hence that proportional 
representation cannot constitute an appropriate normative baseline—reveals, 
at most, only that the appropriate conceptualization of excessive partisanship 
resides elsewhere than in Box 1. 
2. Fairness in Districting.—But where?  Let us start again with the 
notion of what it means for partisanship to be present at all.  Districting is a 
reason-directed activity.  Mapmakers draw district lines in order to advance 
some combination of ends.  Put otherwise, the drawing of lines is responsive 
to practical reason.  It is not performance art.233  Legitimate objectives in the 
shaping of electoral districts include (and are nearly limited to) the following: 
guarding against excessive population disparities, maintaining contiguity and 
compactness, following major geographical features like rivers and 
mountains, tracking political subdivisions, preserving communities of 
interest, ensuring no diminution in the voting strength of racial and ethnic 
minorities, protecting incumbents, securing public acceptance, and 
 
230. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 
UCLA L. REV. 77, 158–59 (1985) [hereinafter Grofman, Criteria for Districting] (“The relevant 
question in analysis of partisan gerrymandering is not whether proportionality has been achieved (it 
will not have been), but rather whether there have been egregious violations of fairness in terms of 
inequality of treatment.”); Niemi, supra note 224, at 186 (“I argue that ultimately the Court will 
have to confront directly the gerrymandering issue; but I maintain that the Court need not in any 
way support proportional representation.”). 
231. Peter Schuck, Partisan Gerrymandering: A Political Problem Without Judicial Solution, 
in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 13, at 240, 240; see also Levinson, 
supra note 223 (arguing that approaches to claims of partisan gerrymandering can be driven by 
structural or rights-based concerns and that those who adopt the latter perspective will be irresistibly 
drawn to proportional representation). 
232. Some readers might be inclined to view the proportional representation model also as 
falling within Box 2: How much of the ideal proportionate representation does the actual scheme 
sacrifice?  But for reasons suggested earlier, see supra note 220, if we measure what a redistricter 
sacrifices in order to achieve partisan advantage by reference to the very thing the pursuit of which 
causes the cost to be sustained—a party’s seats in the legislature—then the distinction between the 
cost-based and ends-based measures collapses. 
233. But consider Congressman Phillip Burton, architect of the notorious 1981 California 
congressional redistricting, who defended his blatant Democratic gerrymander as a “contribution to 
modern art.”  See JOHN JACOBS, A RAGE FOR JUSTICE: THE PASSION AND POLITICS OF PHILLIP 
BURTON 435 (1995). 
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promoting party electoral success.  These are possible purposes.  It is not the 
case that a given redistricter attends to all of these purposes all of the time. 
But perhaps legislatures ought to weigh or respect these various sorts of 
considerations in some particular manner.  Perhaps, for example, they ought 
to ensure that all districts fall within some specified percentage of the 
average district’s population, are contiguous, and undivided by hard-to-
traverse geographic features; that each is maximally compact; that once 
compactness of districts is assured, integrity of political subdivisions should 
be maintained to the greatest extent possible; and that, if no single 
redistricting plan is yet determined, communities of interest should be 
preserved.234 
A formula or recipe of this sort would provide a normative baseline 
against which a challenged districting plan could be measured.  But whereas 
the normative baseline of proportional representation is ends-based, this 
normative baseline is cost-based.  It depends on the difference, not between 
what the balance of legislative seats should have been and what it is, but 
between how the legislature should have balanced competing districting 
considerations and how it did so.  We are now in Box 2, not Box 1.  The 
hope, however, remains the same.  If we could reach agreement on principles 
of fairness in districting—how the legislature ought to accommodate 
competing districting considerations—we could speak intelligently about 
whether some challenged redistricting plan departs too far from fair 
principles. 
Kennedy’s ruminations about principles of fair districting can be read in 
just this way.  By complaining that the Court’s “attention ha[d] not been 
drawn to statements of principled, well-accepted rules of fairness that should 
govern districting, or to helpful formulations of the legislator’s duty in 
drawing district lines,”235 Kennedy strongly implies that we could develop a 
rough sense of what a redistricting scheme should look like if only we could 
agree on what fairness in districting requires—how much regard for 
compactness, how much regard for political subdivisions, et cetera.  If a 
challenged district does not look like the ideally fair district, and if the 
departure from ideally fair lines seems well explained by pursuit of partisan 
advantage, then we can conclude that partisan motivation was present.  
Moreover, the greater the gap between the extent to which each interest 
should be realized and its actual realization, the greater the pursuit of partisan 
advantage. 
 
234. See, e.g., Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 224, at 4 (arguing that, in order to identify a 
gerrymander in a pejorative sense, we would need to “identify ‘neutral’ or ‘pre-political’ public 
interest criteria for legislative districting which could command assent from persons who, despite 
opposing partisan affiliations and diverse ideological viewpoints, share a commitment to democratic 
processes and values”). 
235. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1794 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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Plainly, an approach of this sort would confront difficulties in 
application.236  The more fundamental difficulty, however, is simply that we 
do not have a normative baseline of this sort237—which, of course, is also 
Kennedy’s point.  Without judicial acceptance of principles of fair districting 
that direct how redistricters should pursue each of the legitimate districting 
interests, we cannot create the normative baseline against which a cost-based 
conception of excessive partisanship must be measured. 
3. Compactness Fetishists.—Justice Kennedy is right to observe that we 
lack agreement on principles of fair districting that tell us how much 
realization of various interests a legislature should pursue and that, therefore, 
enable us to draw the normatively ideal district lines.  But one might think it 
a little naïve to suppose that a more thorough investigation into relevant 
historical materials could conceivably produce what we are looking for.  
Were it true that manageable standards for administering the constitutional 
ban on excessive partisanship in districting depend upon our ability to 
articulate and agree upon principles of fair districting in the sense I have 
described, then Kennedy might as well have joined the plurality in Vieth.  A 
search for fair principles of this sort is a fool’s errand.238 
Long before Vieth, many commentators had argued just that—we 
cannot agree on principles of fairness in districting and should, therefore, 
declare partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable.239  Some who agree with the 
premise reject the conclusion.  Even if we cannot reach agreement on what 
constitutes fair, they reason, we can recognize cases that are unfair.240  As a 
general proposition, this is plainly true.  But I am skeptical that the insight is 
as useful in this context as its proponents may assume.  We still need to 
articulate this insight in a way that, at the end of the day, can be useful to 
courts.  A general direction that courts should uphold a challenged district 
unless persuaded that it is unfair (or “severely unfair”) will be less intrusive 
than a direction that would require reviewing courts to assure themselves of 
the plan’s fairness, but not obviously much more easily managed.241 
 
236. To start, political scientists would have to develop, and the courts would have to accept, 
individual metrics to measure differences between plans (the actual and the normative) on each of 
the possibly relevant dimensions (e.g., compactness, political subdivision integrity, incumbency 
protection, and the like).  Furthermore, we would need a means to translate deviations on these 
distinct dimensions into a single common metric. 
237. See Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 224, at 4 (arguing that “there are no coherent 
public interest criteria for legislative districting independent of substantive conceptions of the public 
interest, disputes about which constitute the very stuff of politics”). 
238. For an extended critique of Kennedy’s concurrence on essentially these grounds, see 
Hasen, supra note 195. 
239. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 225; Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 224. 
240. See, e.g., Baker, Unfinished Reapportionment Revolution, supra note 22, at 23–24; 
Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1611–15 (1999). 
241. It is essentially for this reason, I think, that Martin Shapiro, who first pressed the point that 
inquiry into the unfair requires far less agreement than does inquiry into the fair, nonetheless 
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Fortunately, the premise of Kennedy’s argument—that we cannot give 
content to the concept of excessive partisanship without recourse to a 
plausible normative baseline, or to “principles of fairness”—is false.  We can 
conceptualize “too much partisanship” in a fully adequate manner, not by 
shifting attention from “fair” to “unfair,” but by abandoning both “fairness” 
and “unfairness” as organizing constructs.  The better response to Kennedy, I 
believe, is that normative baselines fail to capture our intuitive prereflective 
conception of excessive partisanship.  We need a counterfactual (or, more 
generally, positive) baseline, not a normative one.  In terms of the 2 X 2 
matrix presented earlier, we should be looking in the second column, not the 
first. 
Once we decide to measure amounts of partisanship by reference to the 
state of the world had the redistricters not pursued partisan ends at all, we 
still must choose between cost-based and ends-based measures.  To repeat, a 
cost-based measure (Box 3) asks what the redistricters would have done 
absent partisan motives and then determines how far the actual scheme 
departs from the counterfactual one on dimensions such as compactness and 
the integrity of political subdivisions.  The impulse here is simple.  All else 
being equal, the less compact are the districts in a given redistricting plan 
(relative to how compact they would have been had partisanship not been 
considered), or the more pieces into which a given redistricting plan carves 
up political subdivisions (again, relative to the counterfactual baseline), in 
order to advance the dominant party’s chances for electoral success, the 
greater the legislature’s partisan motivation. 
There are, however, two principal problems with this way of 
conceptualizing amounts of partisan motivation.  First, the core measurement 
challenges that confront a cost-based conception measured against a 
normative baseline242 remain when a counterfactual baseline is employed.  
This is especially true because “all else” is rarely equal.  So if the challenged 
scheme is less compact than the counterfactual scheme but happens to better 
respect the integrity of political subdivisions, then the question of how much 
partisanship is afoot might be conceptually unanswerable. 
Second, it is unclear why this particular scalar conception of 
partisanship should have any hold on us.  Commentators frequently criticize 
proposals to use noncompactness as a measure of partisan gerrymandering on 
the grounds that if the state is under no obligation to create the most compact 
districts—indeed, if it is not obligated to create even minimally compact 
districts—then lack of compactness is constitutionally irrelevant.  Proponents 
of a cost-based, normative-baseline conception accept the conclusion but 
deny the antecedent.  They claim that redistricters do have some form of 
 
concluded by throwing his lot in with the nonjusticiability crowd.  See generally Martin Shapiro, 
Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L. REV. 227 (1985). 
242. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
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constitutional duty (even if defeasible) to attend to considerations like 
compactness.  As we have seen, Justice Kennedy denies (reasonably) that 
any such case has been persuasively advanced.  But proponents of a cost-
based, counterfactual-baseline conception do not have even this response 
available to them.  If compactness and other sorts of districting 
considerations have no independent constitutional significance, why should 
we care how greatly a legislature sacrificed such interests in pursuit of 
partisan advantage? 
C. A Solution 
We are left, then, with a final possibility (Box 4): the amount of 
partisanship manifested or embodied in a given redistricting scheme is the 
delta between the controlling party’s expected electoral success under the 
scheme actually adopted and the party’s expected electoral success under the 
scheme that the redistricter would have adopted had securing partisan 
advantage not been a motivating purpose at all.243 
Suppose, for example, that the Republican-controlled Pennsylvania 
legislature expected the scheme it adopted after the 2000 census to net the 
Republicans thirteen seats in the state’s nineteen-person congressional 
delegation.  Suppose too that only ten Republicans would have been 
expected to win election under the redistricting scheme that the legislature 
would have adopted had it not considered partisan advantage at all.  We can 
now describe the amount of partisanship in play as a function of the 
difference between the actually expected thirteen seats and the 
counterfactually expected ten seats.  To be sure, we could describe this 
difference in varied ways—for example, in absolute numbers (three), or as a 
percentage increase in the number of expected seats (30%), or as a 
percentage of the total delegation (15.8%).  But all of these options provide 
us, finally, with a way to answer the “how much” part of the question that a 
majority of the Justices in Vieth explicitly made central: “how much is too 
much?” 
No doubt it will have already occurred to you that this conception of 
excessive partisanship will confront difficulties in application.  Here are 
three: (1) the counterfactual problem of ascertaining what the legislature 
would have done had it not considered partisan advantage at all; (2) the 
prediction problem of estimating how many seats the actual and 
counterfactual schemes can be expected to produce for the relevant parties; 
and (3) the standard problem of deciding the magnitude of the delta that 
separates permissible from excessive. 
 
243. To be sure, a redistricter must be aware of partisan characteristics of the electorate when 
trying to pursue other legitimate objectives—most notably incumbent protection, but also, perhaps, 
ensuring against diminution in the voting strength of racial and ethnic minorities.  See supra section 
II(B)(2).  But this fact does not transform those purposes into the purpose of securing partisan 
advantage. 
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All this is true.  And Part IV will address the magnitude of these 
practical difficulties.  For now, it is enough to recognize that they are 
problems of application, not conceptualization.  As a conceptualization, the 
ends-based, counterfactual-baseline approach has significant virtues. 
First, it meets the stated need.  The ends-based, counterfactual-baseline 
conception of the amount of partisanship enables us to reach a conclusion in 
the hypothetical case of States A and B.244  Because Party B sought a greater 
increase in its electoral fortunes than did Party A, its scheme reflects more 
partisanship, even though that greater increase was bought at lower cost.  
Second, it meets the need in an acceptable way.  It does not rely upon either 
the quixotic hope for “principles of fair districting” or the coherent but 
unacceptable baseline of proportional representation.  Third, it is a structural, 
not rights-based approach.245  Most basically, it does not require that we 
identify any person whose rights were infringed or “burdened,” or who was 
treated “unfairly.”  This approach rests strictly on the assumption 
(admittedly, not defended here) that partisan greed246 produces systemic 
harms or is antithetical to (constitutionally endorsed) democratic values.247  
Fourth, whereas a cost-based conception could apply at both statewide and 
individual district levels, this ends-based conception is intelligible only at the 
statewide level.  Commentators are increasingly recognizing that district-
specific partisan gerrymandering claims are misguided.248  This approach 
makes clear why that is so. 
Indeed, despite passages from Justice Kennedy’s Vieth opinion that (I 
have already suggested) point toward a cost-based, normative-baseline 
conceptualization of degrees of partisanship, the ends-based, counterfactual-
baseline conceptualization resonates with an otherwise somewhat curious 
passage from that concurrence.  After noting that the “excessiveness” of 
 
244. See supra text accompanying notes 221–22. 
245. The principal academic advocates of a structural approach to election law problems 
generally, and to gerrymandering in particular, are Samuel Issacharoff and Rick Pildes, writing 
together and separately.  See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 593 (2002) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Political Cartels]; Pildes, supra note 240; 
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic 
Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998). 
246. I take it to be insightful, not accidental, that election law scholars like Bernard Grofman 
refer to “partisan lust,” not “partisan injustice.”  See, e.g., Bernard Grofman, Criteria for 
Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 114 (1985) (attributing the phrase 
to David R. Mayhew, Congressional Reapportionment: Theory and Practice in Drawing the 
Districts, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970S, at 249, 284 (N. Polsby ed. 1982)). 
247. Like other analyses that identify structural or systemic harms, this approach raises 
questions regarding the appropriate plaintiffs to satisfy standing doctrine.  Although these questions 
are answerable, defending any particular solution would consume more space than seems warranted 
here. 
248. See, e.g., Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redestricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 
767 n.60 (2004) (“Measuring partisan gerrymandering at [the] institutional levels is common in both 
the jurisprudence and the literature . . . .”); Pildes, Democratic Politics, supra note 165, at 73 (“The 
concept of an unfair partisan gerrymander of an individual district is not intelligible.”). 
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“partisan interests in the redistricting process . . . is not easily determined,”249 
Kennedy invites the reader to imagine two redistricting schemes: 
In one State, Party X controls the apportionment process and draws 
the lines so it captures every congressional seat.  In three other States, 
Party Y controls the apportionment process.  It is not so blatant or 
egregious, but proceeds by a more subtle effort, capturing less than all 
the seats in each State.  Still, the total effect of Party Y’s effort is to 
capture more new seats than Party X captured.  Party X’s gerrymander 
was more egregious.  Party Y’s gerrymander was more subtle.  In my 
view, however, each is culpable.250 
For present purposes, the most critical point to observe about this 
passage is that Kennedy focuses on the number of seats that a party seeks to 
capture, rather than on the extent to which the party disregards traditional 
criteria.  The measure of partisanship, in short, is ends-based, not cost-based.  
Furthermore, in referring ultimately to the number of “new seats” that the 
parties have endeavored to capture, the baseline appears positive, not 
normative.  Conspicuously, Kennedy is not attending to the number of 
“undeserved” or “unwarranted” or “unfairly obtained” seats that a party 
might obtain. 
True, this particular positive baseline is not obviously a counterfactual 
one.251  Reference to the number of “new seats” that a party sets out to 
capture (and succeeds in capturing) most naturally suggests a comparison, 
not to a counterfactual baseline—the number of seats that the party would 
have captured had it not specifically set out to capture seats for itself—but to 
a historical one—the number of seats that the party used to have.  I am 
skeptical, however, that a historical baseline is tenable in this context.  
Ordinary (on-cycle) redistricting is necessitated by the fact of demographic 
change.  The district lines must be redrawn.  If the status quo simply cannot 
be preserved, it is not easy to see why the past ought to be thought directly 
relevant.252  Possibly, then, interpreting this passage to imply a historical 
baseline reflects a misreading.  Perhaps “new seats” is just a shorthand for 
those seats that are secured by application of the particular purpose under 
investigation, namely the purpose of satisfying “partisan interests.”  If this is 
 
249. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1798 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
250. Id.  Perhaps the most conspicuous lesson from this passage (though not the one most 
immediately relevant) is that Justice Kennedy, seemingly unlike Justice Breyer, see supra note 207, 
recognizes that the problem of partisan congressional gerrymandering must ultimately be 
appreciated from a nationwide perspective.  Because parties exist across state lines and because 
congressional gerrymandering by a state impacts a national body, we ought not to think about the 
partisan advantages that parties seek wholly in state-by-state isolation. 
251. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (explaining that, strictly speaking, the 
counterfactual baseline is only a species of positive baselines). 
252. It is true that I will later make some use of a historical baseline myself.  See infra section 
IV(B)(2).  But that is as a proxy for the counterfactual baseline, not as a conceptualization of what 
excessive partisanship itself means. 
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so, the baseline implicitly invoked in this passage is the counterfactual.  In 
sum (though I don’t insist on the point), it seems to me that the ends-based, 
counterfactual-baseline conception of degrees of partisanship makes best 
sense of Kennedy’s intriguing hypothetical. 
III. From Meaning to Doctrine 
We have taken a great stride.  By attending seriously to Justice 
Kennedy’s observation that the problem of manageability consists of two 
issues, not one, we have carefully identified conceptually distinct ways in 
which the injection of partisanship into districting could be excessive.  And 
we have given reasons to prefer one of those conceptions—the ends-based, 
counterfactual-baseline conception—over the others.  This is the conception 
of excessive partisanship that I will employ for the remainder of this Article; 
when I speak of excessive partisanship without qualification, I will be 
referring to a legislature’s effort to secure for the dominant party too much of 
an electoral advantage relative to what it would have been likely to receive 
had it not taken partisanship into account.  Having settled on this conception, 
at least provisionally, we nonetheless have some distance yet to travel.  If the 
problem of elaborating the constitutional principle is part of the 
manageability problem writ large, we now arrive at the manageability 
problem writ small. 
I have observed that a clear majority of the Vieth Justices—and perhaps 
all of them—endorse the following constitutional principle: excessive 
partisanship in redistricting is unconstitutional.253  And I have offered a 
coherent and sensible elaboration of this principle: it is unconstitutional for a 
state to pursue too many more seats for a party than the party would likely 
secure if the state did not take partisan considerations into account at all.  
This is a proposed statement of constitutional meaning. 
But meaning is not the same as doctrine.  Judge-announced 
constitutional meaning is just that: the courts’ interpretation of what the 
Constitution means or provides of its own force.  Judge-crafted constitutional 
doctrine is the rule of constitutional law to be applied by courts when 
enforcing constitutional claims.  As leading scholars are increasingly 
emphasizing, these need not be the same thing.254  The next task, then, is to 
 
253. See supra note 192. 
254. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document 
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 79 (2000) (observing that the Constitution “envisions that 
in deciding cases arising under it, judges will offer interpretations of its meaning, . . . develop 
mediating principles, and craft implementing frameworks enabling the document to work as in-
court law”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the 
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 57 (1997) (“Identifying the ‘meaning’ of the Constitution is 
not the Court’s only function.  A crucial mission of the Court is to implement the Constitution 
successfully.  In service of this mission, the Court often must craft doctrine that is driven by the 
Constitution, but does not reflect the Constitution’s meaning precisely.”).  Of course, Henry 
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craft manageable doctrine to implement this meaning of excessive 
partisanship. 
Given the extraordinary unlikelihood, and perhaps impossibility, of ever 
learning just what the legislature really would have done had it not 
considered partisanship, any doctrine designed to implement this meaning of 
excessive partisanship is likely to employ some sorts of proxies or heuristics.  
That is, instead of directing courts to discover what the legislature would 
have done had it not done what it did do, our doctrine should identify a 
different target of inquiry that can serve as an adequate proxy for the 
counterfactual baseline.  Courts would then be directed to treat that proxy as 
though it were the counterfactual baseline itself, for purposes of measuring 
the extent of the partisanship employed. 
That, indeed, is the strategy I will propose.  But we can anticipate at 
least one objection at the outset—namely, that the project of doctrine-
creation is illegitimate.255  If judge-crafted constitutional doctrine is 
something other than what the judiciary interprets the Constitution to mean, 
we might wonder whether the Court has constitutional license to announce 
doctrine in the first place, let alone to impose it upon political actors like 
Congress or the States.  What warrant do courts have to adjudicate 
constitutional disputes by application of “doctrine” that, no matter how 
“manageable,” is something other than constitutionally discoverable 
“meaning”?  Is this not to claim that the “Court has the power, not merely to 
apply the Constitution but to expand it, imposing what it regards as useful 
‘prophylactic’ restrictions upon Congress and the States”?256  And if it is, 
then we confront a challenge.  As Justice Scalia contended in his Dickerson 
dissent, “That is an immense and frightening anti-democratic power, and it 
does not exist.”257 
I believe that Justice Scalia is wrong.  Unfortunately, though, the 
Dickerson majority did not favor him with a reply.  So it will be useful to 
address this objection up front, before we even embark on the project of 
formulating doctrine to implement the constitutional meaning we have thus 
far fleshed out.  It will be helpful, in other words, to examine in rather more 
detail the proper relationship between meaning and doctrine.258 
 
Monaghan pressed essentially this point a generation ago.  See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme 
Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975). 
255. A second objection would be that no adequate proxy exists.  This is not an objection that 
could be met at the threshold.  Better to treat this worry as an expression of understandable 
skepticism and acknowledge that a burden will lie upon the proponent of any particular doctrine to 
persuade us that the proxies she proposes are likely to serve the task adequately. 
256. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 446 (2000) (Scalia J., dissenting). 
257. Id. 
258. That we may acknowledge a distinction between meaning and doctrine without 
appreciating the nature of that distinction or its consequences exemplifies a common phenomenon 
observed by H.L.A. Hart: 
[I]t is characteristic not only of the use of legal concepts, but also of many concepts in 
other disciplines and in ordinary life, that we may have adequate mastery of them for 
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A. Operative Propositions and Decision Rules 
Suppose that a majority of the Court were to agree with Justice 
Stevens’s view of constitutional meaning: It is impermissible for a legislature 
to pursue any partisan advantage in redistricting.259  I observed earlier that a 
Justice who accepts this view must still craft a manageable standard.260  But 
this is admittedly not self-evident.  One might suppose that the Court could 
simply announce that, henceforth, courts must evaluate claims of 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering by reference to the constitutional 
meaning alone: A challenged redistricting is an unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymander if and only if the legislature did in fact make some line-drawing 
decisions in order to realize partisan advantage.  Under this approach, we 
might say that the courts would employ only meaning, not doctrine.  
Equivalently, we could say that this constitutional doctrine consists only of 
(the Justices’ view of) constitutional meaning. 
This conclusion runs into a difficulty, though.  Courts called upon to 
apply this doctrine (or this meaning, if you prefer) would lack unmediated 
access to the fact of the matter.  Not only would judges not know for sure 
whether the legislature was motivated by partisanship, at least sometimes 
they would know that they do not know.  That is to say, they would be aware 
of the need for some rule, even if implicit, for resolving this epistemic 
uncertainty. 
Now, the solution to this epistemic problem might seem clear.  Courts 
must administer the judge-interpreted constitutional meaning by something 
like a more-likely-than-not standard of review.  Hypothesizing, as we have, 
that the Supreme Court has announced that it is unconstitutional for states to 
pursue any partisan advantage when drawing electoral district lines, future 
courts would be instructed to uphold a claim of unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymandering if and only if persuaded that it is more likely than not that 
the redistricters did in fact pursue partisan advantage to any degree.  This 
solution, it is true, does require that we revise the assumption made two 
paragraphs earlier that constitutional doctrine could consist only of the 
judiciary’s view of constitutional meaning.  But the revision appears trivial.  
We should say, instead, merely that the constitutional doctrine consists of 
 
the purpose of their day-to-day use; and yet they may still require elucidation; for we 
are puzzled when we try to understand our own conceptual apparatus.  We may know 
how to use these concepts, but we cannot say how we do this in ways which are 
intelligible to others and indeed to ourselves.  We know, and yet do not fully 
understand . . . .  This surely is the predicament which makes the philosophical 
elucidation of concepts necessary . . . . 
H.L.A. Hart, Analytical Jurisprudence in Mid-Twentieth Century: A Reply to Professor 
Bodenheimer, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 964 (1957). 
259. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1811–12 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 
supra text accompanying notes 126–30. 
260. See supra text accompanying note 196. 
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judge-interpreted constitutional meanings and the more-likely-than-not 
standard of review. 
That is not, however, quite the right lesson to draw.  What the 
inescapable fact of epistemic uncertainty really reveals is that constitutional 
doctrine must consist of judge-interpreted constitutional meaning (like 
Justice Stevens’s view that the Constitution prohibits any pursuit of partisan 
advantage in redistricting) conjoined to some rule that directs courts how to 
determine whether that meaning is complied with.  In previous work, I have 
proposed to call the former doctrinal component a “constitutional operative 
proposition” and the latter a “constitutional decision rule.”261  That is to say, 
“constitutional doctrine” is not reducible to “constitutional meaning”; it must 
consist of (at the least) a constitutional operative proposition and a 
constitutional decision rule.  The more-likely-than-not standard is a possible 
decision rule, indeed the most common one.  We might fairly call it the 
“default” or “standard” decision rule.  But it is not the only possible decision 
rule, and, in many contexts, it may not be the best. 
One obvious alternative to the more-likely-than-not decision rule would 
be to impose upon the challenger a heightened standard of proof.  For exam-
ple, were the Court to adopt Justice Stevens’s view of constitutional 
meaning—if, in my jargon, they endorsed his preferred constitutional 
operative proposition—they could administer it by means of a decision rule 
that required excessive partisanship to be proved by clear and convincing 
evidence.262  But a nonstandard decision rule could do more than merely 
tweak the standard of proof.  It could employ a rebuttable or conclusive 
presumption.  Tellingly, that is precisely Stevens’s proposed solution.  
Having claimed that any pursuit of partisan advantage is unconstitutional, he 
proposed to administer this operative proposition by means of an 
underenforcing decision rule by which courts would be permitted to conclude 
that there was some partisanship only “if the only possible explanation” for a 
particular district’s shape was that partisan motivation “predominate[d].”263 
 
261. Two notes about this vocabulary.  First, the “constitutional operative proposition” is the 
judicial understanding of constitutional meaning.  It is not “constitutional meaning” simpliciter 
because what the Constitution means may still be in dispute—outside the Court and within it—even 
after a majority of the Court has announced what it takes the constitutional meaning to be.  Second, 
I use the term “constitutional decision rule” to signify the rule or procedure a court is instructed to 
apply in order to “decide” whether the operative proposition is complied with.  It is not the same as 
a “rule of decision” as the Rules of Decision Act uses that term.  For more detailed remarks about 
this nomenclature, see Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 18, at 58 n.192. 
262. Compare Erfer v. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325, 331 (Pa. 2002) (“A plaintiff bears a 
heavy burden to prove it unconstitutional.  ‘A statute will only be declared unconstitutional if it 
clearly, palpably and plainly violates the constitution.’” (citation omitted)). 
263. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1809–12 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  In claiming 
that Justice Stevens’s approach nicely reflects the distinction between operative propositions and 
decision rules, I do not mean to endorse his reliance on the notion of “dominant” and “predominant” 
purposes.  Whether employed in an operative proposition or a decision rule, this notion is not, I 
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B. The Ubiquity of Nonstandard Decision Rules264 
Judge-announced constitutional doctrines cannot be just the Court’s 
view of constitutional meaning.  They must additionally contain decision 
rules.  And while the more-likely-than-not decision rule is the most intuitive 
and common, it is far from the only possibility.  As Justice Stevens’s Vieth 
dissent manifests, a given constitutional doctrine could consist of an 
operative proposition conjoined to what we might term a “nonstandard” 
decision rule—a decision rule that either requires that the operative 
proposition be proved by some quantum of proof greater or less than more-
likely-than-not or that incorporates rebuttable or conclusive presumptions. 
Importantly, judicial resort to nonstandard decision rules is not merely a 
logical possibility.  There are good reasons why the Court might wish to craft 
them.  Whenever the operative proposition takes the form of a standard, 
rather than a rule, or contains a predicate (like governmental purposes) that is 
hard to discover, an intelligently chosen nonstandard decision rule can 
increase the predictability and consistency of judicial review, reduce 
litigation, and perhaps ameliorate interbranch tension.  In short, a 
nonstandard decision rule can make judicial review much more 
manageable.265  That is why Justice Stevens endorsed one in his Vieth 
dissent.  That is also why nonstandard decision rules turn out to be a common 
feature of our constitutional landscape. 
One of the clearest examples of the Court’s use of a nonstandard 
decision rule is the Miranda doctrine.  Miranda provides (roughly) that 
statements made by a criminal defendant during custodial interrogation are 
not admissible against him in the state’s case in chief unless the police had 
previously supplied the suspect with a canonical set of warnings.266  The 
legitimacy and status of this rule have befuddled academic commentators and 
Supreme Court Justices for decades—as my earlier reference to Justice 
Scalia’s Dickerson dissent exemplifies.  As I have argued at length 
elsewhere,267 however, this confusion can be cleared up once we analyze this 
doctrine into its likely operative-proposition and decision-rule components.  
The operative proposition states that the constitutional privilege against self-
 
believe, coherent (if intended to capture any notion short of lexical primacy).  See, e.g., Ely, supra 
note 109, at 611–14.  And the Vieth plurality was right to ridicule its use by Stevens.  Or perhaps I 
should say the plurality would have been right to ridicule that use had all members of the plurality 
not endorsed precisely this test in the racial gerrymandering context.  See Miller v. Johnson, 515 
U.S. 900, 916 (1995).  But see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1000–03 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring 
joined by Scalia, J.) (preferring a doctrine under which any use of race in redistricting would 
provoke strict scrutiny). 
264. With apologies to David Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 
190 (1988). 
265. But see supra note 198 (observing that at least some of these benefits accruing from a 
nonstandard decision rule might not be best conceived in terms of improving doctrine’s 
“manageability”). 
266. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
267. See Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 18, at 114–66. 
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incrimination268 prohibits courts from admitting into evidence out-of-court 
statements by the accused that had been compelled from him by the police.  
The decision rule directs that courts must conclusively presume that a 
statement was compelled (in the sense that the operative proposition 
contemplates) if it was elicited during custodial interrogation not preceded by 
a specified set of warnings. 
Now, to mention Miranda might seem against interest.  Even if the case 
does appear to employ a nonstandard decision rule, it is such an 
exceptional—even notorious—example as perhaps to bolster, rather than to 
allay, doubts about the legitimacy of decision rules of this form.  This 
criticism is misplaced.  To be sure, the particular nonstandard decision rule 
adopted in Miranda might have been poorly chosen.  But the mere fact that 
the Miranda Court crafted a conclusive presumption decision rule to 
administer its view of Fifth Amendment meaning is not at all unusual.  
Nonstandard decision rules are standard fare—employed by Justices with 
widely varied judicial philosophies, across every field of constitutional 
law.269 
Consider, for example, another clause of the Fifth Amendment—the 
Takings Clause.  In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Court, per 
Justice Scalia, held that a condition on the grant of a permit to exceed an 
otherwise valid land use restriction constitutes an unconstitutional taking if 
the condition does not serve the same governmental purpose as does the 
restriction itself.270  But the Court did not adequately explain why the 
Constitution forbids a state from trading some reduction in its ability to 
realize the particular interest served by a given land use restriction for an 
increased realization of another bona fide and legitimate state interest. 
Nollan does make sense, however, if we suppose that the Court was 
employing a nonstandard decision rule.  Think of the permit condition (e.g., 
that the landowner would provide a public easement in exchange for a 
desired development permit) not as a condition but as a command.  In that 
case, the state would be engaged in a taking for which it would owe just 
compensation.  The operative proposition that emerges from Nollan might be 
that it is unconstitutional for a state to withhold a development right it would 
otherwise provide for the purpose of pressuring the landowner on whom the 
“permit condition” is imposed to waive her right to just compensation.  That 
is a plausible understanding of constitutional meaning.  It is not, however, 
easily managed by courts.  How would a court determine whether the state 
was acting in good faith when refusing the requested development permit 
upon the landowner’s refusal to comply with the condition?  The short 
 
268. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself . . . .”). 
269. Some of the following examples are drawn from Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 
supra note 18, at 61–78, 108–13, where other illustrations are also provided. 
270. 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
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answer is that a court will not have to, for the Nollan decision rule directs 
courts to conclusively presume that a state would be withholding an offered 
development right for the purpose of pressuring the landowner to waive her 
Fifth Amendment right to compensation whenever the condition serves a 
different governmental interest than the development ban to which the 
condition is attached. 
Or consider the Fourth Amendment right to be free from “unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”271  This language seems to make unconstitutional any 
search or seizure that, under all the circumstances, is not reasonable.  Yet the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine provides, inter alia, that a police officer 
who has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed an 
offense in his presence does not violate the Fourth Amendment by executing 
a full custodial arrest no matter how trivial the criminal offense, how low the 
risk of flight, and how high the cost to the arrested person and innocent third 
parties.272  Furthermore, in order to ensure that the arrestee cannot use a 
weapon to resist arrest and cannot conceal or destroy evidence, the arresting 
officer may—again without violating the Fourth Amendment—search the 
entire passenger compartment of the car in which the arrestee was found, 
even if the arrestee is securely held beyond the reach of the car at the time of 
the search.273  Doctrines such as these make little sense as elaborations of 
what it truly means for a search or seizure to be constitutionally reasonable.  
They might make sense, however, as decision rules that instruct courts to 
conclusively presume searches and seizures to be reasonable under the 
specified circumstances. 
Equal protection jurisprudence is also profitably conceived as 
comprised of nonstandard decision rules.  Very possibly, the equal protection 
operative proposition is best understood as a genuine balancing norm under 
which the stringency of the justification constitutionally demanded of any 
classification is always a function of the harm that the classification imposes.  
Under this view, strict scrutiny would be a decision rule.  And an 
overenforcing one at that: The (concededly unusual, but surely imaginable) 
sort of racial classification that produces only trivial individual and social 
harm would satisfy the operative proposition so long as supported by 
moderate justification, but would be adjudged to have violated the Equal 
Protection Clause unless narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest. 
The rational basis test is even more plainly a nonstandard decision rule.  
It might well be that, outside of classifications that discriminate against 
suspect and quasi-suspect classes or that infringe fundamental rights, state 
action does not violate the equal protection operative proposition so long as 
reasonably adopted to serve any genuine and legitimate state interest.  The 
 
271. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
272. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). 
273. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–63 (1981). 
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rational basis decision rule, however, directs courts, in effect, to conclude 
that the challenged classification does in fact reasonably serve the state’s 
ends “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts” under which the 
rational relationship would hold true.274 
Nonstandard decision rules are not somehow limited to individual 
rights.  They are at home in federalism and separation of powers contexts, 
too.  It appears, for instance, that the Court will uphold an exercise of 
Congress’s tax power275 against the claim that it was adopted for an 
impermissible regulatory purpose so long as the tax does in fact produce 
revenue.276  Is this the Court’s understanding of constitutional meaning?  Not 
likely.  As Justice Jackson suggested, it makes more sense to understand 
Congress’s constitutional taxing authority not to extend beyond the “rational 
or good-faith revenue measure.”277  But, as Jackson also acknowledged, this 
is not an easy rule for courts to administer.  The tax decision rule, 
accordingly, directs courts to conclusively presume that the challenged 
measure is supported by a bona fide revenue-raising purpose (as the 
operative proposition requires) so long as it does produce revenue. 
Commerce Clause doctrine can be understood similarly.  The doctrine 
presently being developed by the Rehnquist Court is frequently and fairly 
criticized on the ground (among others) that the question of whether the 
intrastate activity being regulated has an economic or noneconomic character 
cannot sensibly have the constitutional significance that Lopez and Morrison 
attribute to it.278  But the aggregate effects test is similarly subject to criticism 
on the ground (among others) that it confers upon Congress a de facto police 
power.  It could be, though, that both approaches embody decision rules 
crafted to administer a similar operative proposition, perhaps one requiring 
that Commerce Clause legislation have a genuine commercial purpose or 
design.  On this view, the Rehnquist Court has essentially decided to replace 
a post-1937 decision rule that underenforced what limits on congressional 
power the Constitution, properly interpreted, imposes with one that threatens 
to overenforce such limits.279 
Admittedly, the foregoing arguments are condensed and, in places, 
telegraphic.  But no elaboration could fully prove my case.  I have been 
reverse-engineering existing doctrines to show how they can be more satis-
 
274. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (quoting 
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). 
275. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
276. See Kahriger v. United States, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953). 
277. Id. at 35 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
278. While stopping just short of declaring that intrastate activities must always be economic in 
order to be regulable on a substantial-effects rationale, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 
(2000), the Court has nonetheless made clear that this is an extraordinarily important consideration.  
See generally id. at 610–15. 
279. This thought is developed at greater length in Berman, Guillen and Gullibility, supra note 
204. 
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factorily conceptualized as consisting of operative propositions administered 
by nonstandard decision rules.  It is therefore in the nature of the project that 
one could always resist the proffered classifications.280  However, I am not 
committed to the view that each of my illustrations is correct.  I hope, 
instead, to focus the reader’s attention on the forest, not the trees.  Perhaps 
the number and variety of plausible examples will persuade even those who 
are not fully persuaded by any one example alone that nonstandard decision 
rules are too essential a feature of our constitutional jurisprudence to be 
easily dismissed as illegitimate. 
If doubt nonetheless remains, election law jurisprudence should allay it.  
Consider first the racial gerrymandering doctrine.  Under Shaw and its 
progeny, courts must apply strict scrutiny to the drawing of a challenged 
district if persuaded that race was the “predominant factor motivating the 
legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters within or 
without” that district.281  What in this doctrine is operative proposition, what 
is decision rule?  If, as Kennedy observes in Vieth, “[r]ace is an 
impermissible classification,”282 full stop, then the Shaw rule must involve a 
nonstandard decision rule: Conclusively presume that race has been 
employed only if it appears to predominate. 
The clincher, of course, is the one-person, one-vote rule itself.  As 
Justice O’Connor noted in Bandemer, the Baker Court ruled that “the reach 
and meaning of the Equal Protection Clause” prohibited “arbitrary and 
capricious discrimination against individual voters with respect to the weight 
of their votes.”283  It follows that the one-person, one-vote rule, at least as 
applied in congressional districting, is a decision rule that directs courts to 
conclusively presume that the challenged scheme is arbitrary and capricious 
from the mere fact that it minimally departs from perfect equipopulousness. 
C. Decision Rules and Justiciability 
The task left open after Part II was to craft manageable doctrine to 
administer the understanding of excessive partisanship in redistricting that 
that Part had put forth.  This Part has argued that the logical structure of 
constitutional adjudication yields a conceptual distinction between judicial 
statements of interpreted constitutional meaning (“constitutional operative 
 
280. This is famously true of any suggestion that a decision rule takes the form of a conclusive 
presumption.  The nominal doctrine, in each case, seems to say “X is unconstitutional.”  I propose, 
in contrast, that the doctrine is most felicitously analyzed as an operative proposition that says “Y is 
unconstitutional” conjoined to a decision rule that directs “conclude Y if persuaded by a 
preponderance that X.”  Because an analysis of this sort is not provably correct unless and until the 
authoritative doctrine maker endorses the recharacterization, it will always remain open to the 
objection that the nominal doctrine is really just the operative proposition (“X is unconstitutional”) 
and that the unstated decision rule directs “conclude X if persuaded of X by a preponderance.” 
281. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). 
282. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1793 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
283. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 149 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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propositions”) and directions regarding how courts should decide whether 
those meanings are complied with (“constitutional decision rules”).  It has 
further sought to demonstrate that “nonstandard” decision rules that aim to 
get at an operative proposition obliquely by employing proxies and 
conclusive presumptions are pervasive.  Armed with this understanding, we 
can slightly restate where we have been and where we must go.  Part II 
suggested that the Court should recognize, as a constitutional operative 
proposition, that redistricters may not pursue too much of an electoral 
advantage for the dominant party relative to the electoral success that party 
would likely have enjoyed had the redistricter not taken partisanship into 
account.  Part IV will explore how the Court can best craft decision rules to 
administer that meaning. 
But can a manageable decision rule satisfy the commands of 
justiciability?  Baker, after all, indicates that the absence of a “judicially 
discoverable and manageable standard” spells a political question.284  Does 
this mean that the entirety of the judicially announced doctrine—the decision 
rule as well as the operative proposition—must be, in the language of the 
Vieth plurality, “discernible in the Constitution”?285 
Surely not.  Were that the case, then courts would be running afoul of 
the political question doctrine whenever they adjudicated constitutional 
claims by application of nonstandard decision rules.286  All that can be 
demanded, in the context of partisan gerrymandering as elsewhere, is a 
judicially manageable test for sensibly administering the constitutionally 
discernible standard.  That is, the operative proposition need be 
discoverable;287 the decision rule need not be.  Its relationship to the 
constitutionally discernible standard is instrumental and pragmatic.  
Accordingly, the plurality’s suggestions that the “judicially manageable 
standard” must be (merely) “constitutionally based”288 or must bear a 
“relation to constitutional harms”289 put things more aptly. 
 
284. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
285. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1786 (plurality opinion). 
286. This is not strictly so given that the manageability test operates prospectively only, not 
retrospectively.  See Levinson & Young, supra note 198, at 961–62.  And the fact that a court has 
ultimately decided to craft a nonstandard decision rule (a component of doctrine that I am assuming 
is not itself “discernible in the Constitution”) does not entail that that court realized—at the moment 
of assessing a claim’s justiciability—that deployment of a nonstandard decision rule would be 
necessary.  But the gist of the point remains: Even early on, the Court surely understood (or should 
have understood) that it would not be able to administer such majestic constitutional generalities as 
the Equal Protection Clause without crafting doctrine whose every jot and title could not possibly be 
described as constitutionally discoverable. 
287. The operative proposition must be “discoverable” only in the sense that it must arise from 
application of generally (but not unanimously) accepted modalities of constitutional interpretation, 
including, for example, structure and history.  That is, the command of discoverability does not 
entail clause-bound textualism. 
288. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1784 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
289. Id. at 1786 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
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IV. Partisan Gerrymandering Doctrine 
What shape, finally, should this instrumental decision rule take?  How 
should the Court administer the ends-based, conterfactual-baseline 
understanding of excessive partisanship?290  Generally speaking, the Court 
can proceed in at least two ways.  It can adopt a single decision rule that 
would govern all claims of excessive partisanship in gerrymandering, or it 
could craft separate decision rules each of which is predicated on different 
circumstances.291  In Sunstein’s terms, the first approach is wide, the latter is 
narrow.292  To signify that these are not just points on a continuum, but two 
qualitatively distinct alternatives, I will refer to them as wholesale and retail.  
Subpart A proposes one wholesale decision rule designed to cover the 
waterfront.  Subpart B sketches the beginnings of a retail approach by 
identifying three decision rules that courts might reasonably adopt to start 
filling out the relevant space. 
A. A Wholesale Decision Rule 
A wholesale, or one-size-fits-all, option must successfully navigate the 
three difficulties already noted: (1) the counterfactual problem of 
ascertaining what the legislature would have done had it not considered 
partisan advantage at all; (2) the prediction problem of estimating how many 
seats the actual and counterfactual schemes can be expected to produce for 
the relevant parties; and (3) the standard problem of deciding the magnitude 
of the delta that separates permissible from excessive. 
The standard problem is hardly a problem at all, so long as the 
counterfactual and prediction problems are met.  The Supreme Court 
routinely concretizes into more-or-less arbitrary numbers the Justices’ 
intuitions about where, on a continuum, the proper cut-off point lies.293  
Thus, for example, it has held that a population disparity between the most 
and least populous state legislative districts of up to 10% presumptively 
 
290. Issacharoff has proposed that the Court should “establish a prophylactic per se rule that 
redistricting conducted by incumbent powers is constitutionally intolerable”—i.e., that redistricting 
must be undertaken by nonpolitical commissions.  Issacharoff, Political Cartels, supra note 245, at 
601.  In my terminology, he is proposing that our best understanding of constitutional meaning in 
this area be administered by a nonstandard decision rule that employs a conclusive presumption.  
Naturally, I approve of the basic strategy.  His particular decision rule, however, is so overinclusive 
(presumably, many legislative redistrictings stop short of embodying “excessive” partisanship) as to 
have precious little chance of being adopted, or so it seems to me.  Of course, this is a predictive 
claim.  It is agnostic regarding whether the harms produced by excessive partisanship in 
redistricting are so grave as to justify such a substantial degree of prophylaxis. 
291. Of course, the Supreme Court need not do the crafting itself.  It could simply endorse 
decision rules crafted by litigants or lower courts. 
292. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 241–43 (1999). 
293. Cf. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 284–89 (1980) (discussing 
Aquinas’s notion of “determinatio”). 
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satisfies Reynolds.294  The prediction problem is also surmountable.  Courts 
already admit and evaluate expert submissions that, wielding tools developed 
by political scientists, predict electoral outcomes from specified district lines.  
Indeed, the lower court did it in Vieth.295 
The counterfactual problem, in contrast, is a big one.  It is foolish to 
expect that plaintiffs could, by relying on whatever political evidence they 
think is probative, establish to any reasonable degree of confidence what the 
lines would likely have looked like had the legislature not considered 
partisan advantage.  We will have to proceed by proxy. 
Imagine, for example, that we could generate all possible electoral 
maps.  If so, we could then rank them according to the expected partisan 
outcome each would produce, and presume that the legislature would have 
adopted a map that would have yielded the median outcome.  That is, we 
would treat the median outcome as though it were the counterfactual one.  Of 
course, this would be artificial: The true counterfactual map might have 
produced electoral outcomes different from the median outcome of all 
possible maps.  But this is no objection once we acknowledge the 
ineliminability of decision rules.  Given epistemic uncertainty, even the 
default (generally invisible) more-likely-than-not decision rule will produce 
some erroneous outcomes.  So too, necessarily, will nonstandard decision 
rules.  To conclusively treat the median outcome of all maps as though it 
were the outcome of the counterfactual map would produce some errors that 
favor the plaintiff, and some that favor the defendant—as would any decision 
rule. 
No, the inescapable inaccuracy of this approach does not doom it.  What 
dooms it is that it is impossible.  Not only is the task of identifying all 
possible electoral maps beyond the reach of today’s fastest supercomputers 
(even if we restrict ourselves to the subset of all possible maps that satisfy 
the criteria of contiguity and substantial population equality), current views 
about the theoretical limits of computation suggest that a complete 
enumeration will be forever unrealizable.296  It is precisely this impossibility 
 
294. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 160–62 (1993); Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 
835, 842 (1983); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973).  But see Cox v. Larios, 124 S. 
Ct. 2806, 2806 (2004) (holding that Georgia’s legislative reapportionment plan, although falling 
under the 10% rule, violated the one-person, one-vote rule because of partisan political motivation).  
For another example of an arbitrary number, see State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (recognizing that “awards exceeding a single-digit ratio 
between punitive to compensatory damages” rarely satisfy due process). 
295. See Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 546–47 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (considering 
plaintiffs’ expert witness evidence that Pennsylvania’s new congressional districts would 
“guarantee” that thirteen of nineteen elected representatives would be Republican).  In claiming that 
the prediction problem is surmountable, I do not mean to deny that the problem remains 
challenging.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–13, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004) 
(No. 02-1580) (questioning the worth of expert testimony on issues of this sort). 
296. See Micah Altman, Is Automation the Answer: The Computational Complexity of 
Automated Redistricting, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 81, 94–112 (1997). 
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that leads one to a familiar idea in the gerrymandering literature: random 
baselines.  If we could generate some random subset of all possible electoral 
maps297 and treat that random sample as representative of all possibly 
adopted maps, then we could treat the median outcome from this random and 
representative sample as the counterfactual baseline. 
This is getting closer.  Unfortunately, true randomness is also 
impossible because the maps “randomly” generated are constrained by the 
assumptions loaded into the algorithm, which are themselves the product of 
design.298  The algorithm might assume, for example, that each district is 
contiguous and that the scheme as a whole respects specified parameters for 
average and differential district compactness, as well as other specified 
parameters regarding the extent to which various types of political 
subdivisions may be partitioned.  Presumably it would also select only those 
plans that comply with legal requirements supplied by, for example, the 
Voting Rights Act and the Court’s apportionment and racial gerrymandering 
jurisprudence.  The question, then, is whether recognizing that the random-
baseline approach is really only a pseudo-random-baseline approach is 
necessarily fatal to it. 
Let us explore why one might think so.  There is no reason to believe 
that the median outcome of all possible maps or of a truly random subset of 
all possible maps will be systematically biased in any particular direction 
from the outcome that the true (but undiscoverable) counterfactual baseline 
map would have produced.  Any divergence is equally likely to understate as 
to overstate the number of seats that the party in control of the redistricting 
would have realized had it not taken partisanship into account.  Not so, 
perhaps, the median outcome of all maps selected by a pseudo-random 
algorithm.  In particular, critics of the proposal to treat the median outcome 
of the pseudo-random set of maps as the proxy for the counterfactual map are 
likely to believe that the median outcome under such maps will understate 
the outcome that the redistricting party would have achieved had no 
partisanship infected its decisionmaking.  It is not particularly important at 
this time to evaluate whether a contention of this sort is likely to be sound.  
My point is only that, because the critics of partisan gerrymandering are con-
stantly battling uphill—first facing the extraordinarily inhospitable Bandemer 
test, now facing the prospect that such claims will be held nonjusticiable—
the pseudo-random-baseline approach is more likely to be resisted on the 
ground of its being too plaintiff-friendly, not too defendant-friendly.299 
 
297. For just one example of an attempt along these lines, see Carmen Cirincione et al., 
Assessing South Carolina’s 1990s Congressional Districting, 19 POL. GEOGRAPHY 189 (2000). 
298. For a demonstration, see Micah Altman & Michael McDonald, A Method of Revealed 
Preferences for Evaluating Intent in Redistricting (unpublished manuscript, undated), at app. A.  
For early insistence on this point, see Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 224, at 62. 
299. Admittedly, it might also be resisted on the ground of being too Republican-friendly: 
Insofar as compactness will inevitably feature in the randomizing algorithm, the outcomes at every 
percentile are likely to systematically favor Republican interests given that Democratic voters tend 
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But if this is so, one possible fix suggests itself.  We could simply treat 
as the counterfactual baseline, not the median outcome produced by the set of 
pseudo-random maps, but some outcome at a specified distance from the 
median.  For example, we could allow the defendant to adopt as the counter-
factual baseline any outcome within a standard deviation of the mean 
outcome, or between, say, the 25th and 75th percentiles.  So long as the 
algorithm that produced the pseudo-random maps were reasonable (a 
standard far short of ideal), some defendant-friendly revision of this sort 
should correct against overly intrusive judicial intervention. 
Putting all this together, we see the form that a decision rule could take.  
The Supreme Court could direct courts to conclude that the legislature 
pursued partisan advantage to an unconstitutional extent if the plaintiff 
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the expected partisan value of 
the challenged scheme (to the party with majority control of the legislature) 
is more than x% greater than the expected partisan value of the redistricting 
scheme in the yth percentile of all maps generated in an appropriately 
pseudo-random fashion. 
Admittedly, this is more the framework for a decision rule than it is a 
fully formed proposal.  The Court, likely after considerable percolation in the 
lower courts, would have to select values for x and y.  Yet more challenging, 
it would have to provide sufficient guidance regarding the acceptable 
parameters of the pseudo-randomizing algorithm.  There is no obviously 
right answer on matters such as these.  One solution would be to announce 
some values for x and y as presumptions and authorize lower courts to pass 
on pseudo-randomizing algorithms supplied by the parties themselves.300  In 
this way, the decision rule could continue to take shape over time, common-
law style. 
An illustration, based on the Vieth litigation, might help illustrate the 
proposed methodology.  To start, I am assuming that the median electoral 
outcome produced by all the maps that could be generated given a range of 
 
to cluster in cities.  However, it does not strike me as a persuasive argument against this approach 
that reliance on pseudo-random baselines (as a proxy for the counterfactual baseline) might prove to 
be more favorable to Republicans, and less favorable to Democrats, than some other possible 
approaches to the problem, including nonjusticiability.  But this might be mistaken. 
300. Two thoughts come to mind, both very tentative.  First, the algorithm ought not be 
permitted to include any parameters for “communities of interest” because this notion is too 
nebulous and serves as too ready a proxy for partisan affiliation.  And although excluding 
communities of interest from the pseudo-random districting schemes is a little artificial—some such 
communities might matter to a nonpartisanly motivated legislature—the consequence of this 
omission would be slight insofar as genuinely nonpartisan accommodation of these communities is 
likely to cancel out, from the perspective of the partisan ledger.  Second, although courts are in no 
position to write algorithms themselves, they could find that parties present them with very 
palatable alternatives if courts employ baseball-style arbitration as the means for selecting from 
among the universe of plausible candidates.  This might be especially true if courts turn a skeptical 
eye to aspects of a party’s proposal that differ from what the party has advanced in litigation in 
other states. 
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plausible map-drawing assumptions is a fair proxy for the electoral outcome 
that would have obtained under the map that the legislature would have 
enacted had it not considered partisanship at all, i.e., the counterfactual map.  
For example, if the median expected electoral outcome in Pennsylvania, 
under all the maps that could have been drawn consistent with specified line-
drawing assumptions would have given Republicans 9.9 out of the state’s 19 
seats,301 then it seems reasonable to assume that the map that would have 
been drawn had partisanship not entered into the redistricting calculus would 
have resulted in the election of 9.9 Republicans.  By calling this a reasonable 
assumption, I mean that we lack compelling reason to accept either of the 
two competing assumptions that the counterfactual map would likely have 
produced for the Republicans (a) more than 9.9 seats or (b) less than 9.9 
seats.  Consequently, had the Court interpreted the Constitution to provide 
that redistricters may take no account of partisan advantage, then it might 
sensibly adopt a decision rule under which any map that would have likely 
yielded for the Republicans more than 9.9 expected seats would be presumed 
(or adjudged) to be unconstitutional. 
But the Court has not interpreted the Constitution to proscribe all 
pursuit of partisan advantage.  Instead, it has declared that the Constitution 
forbids only excessive pursuit of partisan advantage, some such partisan 
motivation being constitutionally permissible.  This is the reason for 
introducing x: even if the expected electoral outcome under the 
counterfactual map would have been 9.9 Republican seats, a Republican-
dominated legislature is constitutionally entitled to adopt a map that can be 
expected to yield something more than 9.9 seats.  If x is, say, 10% of the 
party’s otherwise expected seats, then the decision rule might direct courts to 
adjudge any plan adopted by the Republican-controlled Pennsylvania 
legislature to reflect unconstitutionally excessive partisanship if it is expected 
to yield more than 10.89 Republican seats. 
Variable y is designed to give the state one additional layer of 
protection.  I have said above that if the pseudo-randomizing formula were 
good, then the median outcome supplies the single most reasonable assump-
tion for the counterfactual map; no single other assumption is more 
reasonable.  But, invariably, the formula will be contested by both sides.  The 
state might argue, for example, that even had it not considered partisanship at 
all, it would have drawn district lines with far more concern for preserving 
the integrity of subdivisions, and concomitantly less concern for average 
district compactness, than the algorithm reflects.  As a result, the median 
Republican outcome understates the success that the Republican Party could 
 
301. That application of this decision rule introduces fractional representatives should not be 
treated as a problem.  Sophisticated models for predicting electoral delegations will always generate 
fractional results.  A moment’s reflection reveals why this should be: Although districts with 55% 
and 85% Republican majorities are both likely to produce Republican office holders, they are not 
equally likely to do so. 
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have expected under the counterfactual map.  Plaintiffs would argue, in 
essence, the opposite—say, that the formula does not give sufficient weight 
to district compactness, or mistakenly weights average district compactness 
more heavily than minimizing the distance between the most and least 
compact districts, or wrongly employs a dispersion measure of compactness 
when it should have employed a perimeter measure.  Whatever the particular 
arguments, they would be designed to establish, of course, that the median 
Republican outcome under the pseudo-randomly generated maps overstates 
what the Republicans could have expected to achieve under the 
counterfactual map. 
There are sound reasons, grounded in concern for the separation of 
powers, to consider an erroneous judicial invalidation of a challenged scheme 
to be a weightier social harm than an erroneous judicial validation.  Courts 
can partially accommodate this fact by pegging the counterfactual electoral 
baseline (the expected electoral outcome under the map that the legislature 
would have enacted had it not considered partisan advantage) not at the 
median of all maps produced pseudo-randomly, but at some distance y from 
the median—say, a quartile.  Suppose now that, although the median 
electoral outcome of the pseudo-random assortment of maps would yield 9.9 
Republicans, the outcome in the 75th percentile of maps would have been 
expected to produce 10.7 Republican victories.  Because the in party is 
constitutionally permitted to strive to increase its electoral success by up to 
10%  (we are assuming), it follows that a redistricting scheme adopted by the 
Pennsylvania Republicans could be presumed to be infected by excessive 
partisanship were it expected to yield more than 11.77 Republican 
victories.302 
Lest I be read as overselling a decision rule of this form, let me clearly 
acknowledge some of its deficits.  It is complex and inelegant.  Particulars of 
the pseudo-randomizing algorithms will always be contestable and contested.  
At the level of detail represented by the variables x and y, it is inescapably 
arbitrary.  But it is a conceptually coherent solution to the problem and, I 
believe, feasible.  Can any decisive objections be leveled against it?  Twenty 
 
302. To make clear, although x and y are both intended to offer state defendants protection 
against overly intrusive judicial intervention, they do so in different ways.  Variable x reflects the 
fact that, according to the Court, the line of constitutionality runs between excessive and permissible 
degrees of partisanship, not between some partisanship and none; variable y modifies an admittedly 
imperfect decision rule in a defendant-friendly direction.  It is tempting, but wrong, to suppose that 
we could achieve the same result more simply by eliminating y and increasing x.  The cash value of 
moving from the median to the yth percentile for purposes of fixing the supposed counterfactual 
baseline will depend upon the demographic and geographic characteristics of the state in question.  
In some states, plausible nonpartisan districting criteria might produce a very wide range of 
electoral outcomes.  In other states, the electoral outcomes that could be expected under plausible 
nonpartisan criteria would be much more narrowly circumscribed.  It seems appropriate that, all else 
being equal, courts should accept as constitutional a more skewed electoral outcome under the 
former conditions than under the latter.  This can be accomplished by incorporating factors x and y 
into the decision rule; it cannot be accomplished by using only the single variable x. 
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years ago, for example, Richard Niemi lodged the following two objections 
against reliance on pseudo-random baselines:303  First, it is “difficult to find a 
constitutional basis for requiring” their use.  Second, 
to require use of this type of baseline would entail heavy reliance on 
proportional representation.  Even though such a baseline would not 
force the proportion of seats and votes to be equal, it would impose a 
statistical test to see if the seats to votes ratio was “too far” from what 
would occur naturally.304 
Do these criticisms tell against my proposed decision rule too? 
They don’t.  The second objection simply has no bearing.  The analysis 
I propose entails no reliance on proportional representation.  There is no need 
to consider seat-to-vote ratios at all. 
Niemi’s first objection is slightly different.  He is right that it is difficult 
to understand why a departure from a baseline of what the partisan 
distribution of seats would be under a set of districting schemes identified 
pseudo-randomly renders a particular plan unconstitutional.  Put in my terms, 
it is hard to see why the pseudo-random-district baseline would function as 
any part of the constitutional operative proposition.  But, of course, that is 
not my claim.  If a plan is unconstitutional it is because the expected electoral 
outcome departs too far from the expected electoral outcome under the 
counterfactual plan.  The constitutionally relevant baseline is the 
counterfactual one.  We would consider expected electoral outcomes under a 
pseudo-random assortment of redistricting plans only as a proxy for the 
expected outcome under the plan that the legislature would have adopted had 
it not pursued partisan advantage.  I do not contend—indeed, I deny—that 
reference to any sort of pseudo-random baseline is “constitutionally 
required.” 
B. Some Retail Decision Rules 
Although I believe that a wholesale decision rule roughly of the form 
just outlined holds promise, there is no denying that it is an ambitious 
solution.  A more modest alternative approach, still consistent with the 
arguments developed in Parts II and III of this Article, would be for courts to 
develop decision rules more closely tailored to the facts of the cases in which 
claims of unconstitutionally partisan gerrymandering arise.  This strategy 
would produce some number of decision rules all predicated on different 
circumstances: Under circumstances C1, conclude that the legislature violated 
the ban on unconstitutionally excessive partisanship in redistricting if M; 
under circumstances C2, conclude that the legislature violated the ban on 
unconstitutionally excessive partisanship in redistricting if N; et cetera. 
 
303. Although Niemi nominally focused on “random district” baselines, his criticisms 
necessarily apply to pseudo-random variants.  Niemi, supra note 224, at 207. 
304. Id. at 208. 
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Because it involves a mid-decade gerrymander, the Texas case, Session 
v. Perry,305 provides a textbook example of what one sensible retail decision 
rule would look like.  Accordingly, this final section concentrates on a 
decision rule tailored to the context of mid-decade redistricting.  But even a 
reader who finds such a decision rule justifiable and attractive might 
nonetheless worry that it is more likely to exhaust than to illustrate the 
universe of sensible and manageable retail decision rules.  As a response to 
understandable skepticism of this sort, this subpart concludes by offering two 
brief additional examples of possible retail decision rules designed to 
administer the constitutional ban on excessive partisanship in redistricting.  
The basic thrust here is not to insist that any one of these proposed retail 
decision rules is optimal.  More modestly, it is to offer some grounds to be 
optimistic that the general strategy I recommend—embracing my proposed 
understanding of excessive partisanship, and then constructing instrumental 
decision rules—is likely to prove fruitful when litigants and lower courts are 
enlisted into the effort. 
1. Mid-decade Redestricting.—One consequence of the Court’s rule 
that electoral districts be nearly equipopulous is to require legislatures to 
redraw state districts after each decennial census.  Perhaps because the 
process is contentious, costly, and time-consuming, however, states have not 
traditionally redistricted with any greater frequency than that.  In 2003, 
though, Texas did.306  Prodded by House majority leader Tom DeLay, the 
Texas Legislature, under unified Republican control, took up the issue of 
congressional redistricting even though a lawful map was already in place.  
Resisting this unprecedented move, a group of Democratic members of the 
Texas House fled to Oklahoma to break the quorum and prevent the 
redistricting legislation from being considered that session.  In response, 
Republican Governor Rick Perry called the legislature into special session 
for the sole purpose of considering redistricting.  This time, the plan hit a 
snag in the Texas Senate, as 11 of the 31 senators announced that they 
opposed redistricting.  Because long-standing tradition in the senate had 
required that a measure be supported by two-thirds of the membership before 
the full senate will consider it, this opposition doomed the legislation. 
Undeterred, the Republican lieutenant governor announced that he 
would not recognize the two-thirds rule and called a second special session 
on congressional redistricting.  This session too ended in failure when the 11 
senators fled to New Mexico, depriving the Senate of a quorum.  Later, when 
one of their number returned to Texas, Governor Perry called a third special 
 
305. 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004). 
306. Texas was not alone.  The Republican-controlled Colorado legislature did the same.  
Interpreting the Colorado state constitution to prohibit mid-decade congressional redistricting, 
however, the Colorado Supreme Court struck it down on state-law grounds.  See People ex rel. 
Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1237–40 (Colo. 2003). 
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session at which the Republican plan—designed to give Republicans a 22–10 
edge in the state’s congressional delegation—passed on a nearly perfect 
party-line vote.307 
Although the Texas redistricting effort provided more drama than its 
Pennsylvania cousin, the output was in many respects similar.  Like the 
Pennsylvania gerrymander, the Texas plan reflects only moderate regard for 
compactness and the integrity of political subdivisions, and it also pairs many 
Democratic incumbents with each other or with Republican incumbents in 
heavily Republican districts.  More significantly, the partisan motivation 
was, again, both extreme and avowed.  As State Representative Phil King, 
one of the House leaders of the redistricting battle, admitted, the Republican 
leadership’s goal was to “get as many seats as we could.”308  Or, as a 
Republican staffer put it, the plan was designed to “assure that Republicans 
keep the house [of Representatives] no matter the national mood.”309 
In one conspicuous respect, however, the Texas gerrymander differs 
from the Pennsylvania gerrymander upheld in Vieth: The Pennsylvania 
legislature was constitutionally obligated to redistrict as a result of the 2000 
census.  In contrast, when the Texas legislature got started, a constitutionally 
valid districting plan based on 2000 census data was already in place, having 
been adopted by judicial order in 2001.310  The Texas scheme, but not the 
Pennsylvania one, was adopted mid-decade to replace a legally valid scheme.  
It was a redistricting of choice, not necessity. 
For at least two reasons, the mid-decade, or off-cycle, character of the 
Texas gerrymander represents a distinction with a difference.311  First, the 
 
307. The Texas gerrymander received considerable attention in the media.  The foregoing facts 
have been pulled from a collection of sources.  For a general overview of the events surrounding the 
Texas gerrymander, see R.G. Ratcliffe et al., 78th Texas Legislature; On the lam in Oklahoma; 
Fugitive Democrats, GOP Point Fingers across Red River; House will Stay Shut, Rebels Vow, 
HOUS. CHRON., May 14, 2003, at A1; Bennett Roth & Rachel Graves, Special Session, Texas 
Legislature; DeLay: Senators Violating Constitution; Says 11 Who Fled to Derail Redistricting 
‘Don’t Understand Honor’, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 18, 2003, at A13.  For a discussion of the role of 
House majority leader Tom DeLay, see LOU DUBOSE & JAN REID, THE HAMMER: TOM DELAY, 
GOD, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF THE REPUBLICAN CONGRESS 199 (2004).  As further evidence of 
the redistricting’s partisan influence, Texas Republicans gained six congressional seats in the 
November 2004 election.  See Chuck Lindell, A New Map, A New Rise to Power, AUSTIN 
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Nov. 4, 2004, at A1 (reporting that redistricting “not only cost Texas 
Democrats six congressional seats” but also “the combined loss of 102 years of House experience as 
members retired, switched parties or lost elections”). 
308. Jurisdictional Statement at 13 n.25, Jackson v. Perry, 2004 WL 792334 (2004) (No. 03-
1391). 
309. Id. at 12. 
310. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 458 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (citing Balderas v. Texas, No. 
6:01-CV-158, slip op. (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2002), aff’d mem., Balderas v. Texas, 536 U.S. 919 
(2002)); see also Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 528 (Ward, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (describing the previous, court-ordered plan as “a plan that is beyond dispute a legal one”). 
311. Plaintiffs have challenged the Texas scheme on a variety of additional grounds, including 
racial gerrymandering and violations of the Voting Rights Act.  See Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 457.  
In examining only the partisan gerrymandering issues, I do not intend to express any view on the 
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possibility of off-cycle redistricting permits legislatures to pursue much more 
extreme partisan gerrymanders.  Second, the fact of an off-cycle redistricting 
constitutes powerful evidence that the legislature was in fact motivated to 
pursue extreme partisan goals.312 
To appreciate the first point, one need only attend, ironically, to the 
reasons Justice O’Connor gave in Bandemer for holding claims of partisan 
gerrymandering nonjusticiable.  Relying on the work of political scientist 
Bruce Cain, O’Connor based her position in part on the assertion that “there 
is good reason to think that political gerrymandering is a self-limiting 
enterprise.”313  In a nutshell, Cain’s (and O’Connor’s) argument goes as 
follows: The extremity of a gerrymander is a function of the extent to which 
the controlling party can make its own districts efficient (involving very 
small margins of victory) and the opposing party’s districts inefficient (very 
large margins of victory).  But the more efficient the district, the bigger the 
risk.  Because the party itself and the individual incumbents will be 
somewhat risk averse, they will draw districts to produce larger cushions 
than rigorous pursuit of partisan advantage would seem to dictate. 
This is persuasive as far as it goes.  But the efficiency that a party or an 
incumbent will tolerate is not only a function of its or her degree of risk 
aversion, it is also a function of the time horizon.  The riskiness of any given 
district is inversely proportional to the expected margin of victory in the next 
election and directly proportional to the expected number of elections before 
the next redistricting—as Cain’s own analysis makes clear.314  Therefore, 
O’Connor’s argument that political gerrymandering is likely to be self-
limiting depends heavily on the assumption that redistricting will occur only 
once per decade.315  Significantly, if a party’s control of the state legislature 
 
possible validity of any other sorts of claims.  Although the three-judge district court upheld the 
scheme against all of these challenges, and although, presumably, only the partisan gerrymandering 
issue is alive on remand, any of the claims could potentially serve as the basis for a successful 
subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court. 
312. If the Court wanted to eliminate all partisan gerrymanders, not only the “excessively 
partisan” variety, it would have an additional reason to disfavor off-cycle redistricting.  If 
legislatures are permitted to redistrict whenever they want, they can choose to do so when the state 
government is fully in the hands of a single party.  But permitting redistricting to occur only at 
specified times (for instance, after each decennial census is reported) increases the chance that the 
legislature to whom the obligation falls will be unable to advance strictly partisan goals.  See Cox, 
supra note 248, at 800–02.  Because a solid majority of the Court has made clear that it does not 
view all partisan motivation as unconstitutional, however, I do not rely on this consideration. 
313. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 152 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing BRUCE 
CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 151–59 (1984)). 
314. See, e.g., CAIN, supra note 313, at 152 (explaining that a majority party’s willingness to 
gerrymander depends on its “estimate of long-range political and demographic trends”); id. at 156 
(referring to one study that “suggests that whatever partisan advantage the controlling party gets 
from reapportionment tends to erode quickly over time with changes in the composition of districts” 
and concluding that “partisan gerrymandering is technically difficult because time and geography 
can undo the reapportioner’s craft”). 
315. Incidentally, Justice O’Connor’s conclusion is suspect for another reason too.  The 
severity of a gerrymander is a function not only of the efficiency that the controlling party will 
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is secure, the mere possibility of off-cycle redistricting can be enough to 
embolden gerrymanders more extreme than would otherwise occur: The 
party can accept narrower expected margins of victory in its “own” districts 
than it otherwise would so long as it can be confident that off-cycle redis-
tricting will be possible in the event that those highly efficient districts 
threaten to become too efficient—i.e., too risky.  So a regime that permits 
off-cycle redistricting is likely to produce more egregious gerrymanders even 
when the option is not exercised. 
And what if that option is exercised?  As suggested earlier, redistricting 
is, across a number of dimensions, a costly enterprise.  This is well illustrated 
by the Texas experience, which consumed, among other things, three special 
sessions, scores of hearings across the state, one long-standing state senate 
rule, and, by most accounts, much of whatever amity had existed between the 
two parties in Texas.  It is elementary that the more costly an optional 
activity, the greater must be the expected payoff before a rational actor will 
engage in it.  Because the most obvious types of payoff that redistricters 
expect from redistricting are incumbency protection and partisan advantage, 
we can expect—courts can expect—that the partisan advantage pursued in an 
off-cycle redistricting is likely to be substantial, not modest. 
These two reasons, in combination, strongly recommend one retail 
decision rule that courts can adopt to administer the Vieth-recognized 
constitutional ban on excessive partisanship in redistricting: Courts should 
conclude that mid-decade redistrictings undertaken by a single-party-
controlled state government are motivated by excessive partisanship—hence 
are unconstitutional—unless narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
interest.316  The three-judge district court to which the Supreme Court 
 
tolerate (which is itself a function of the time between redistrictings), but also of the extent to which 
that party is willing to flout traditional districting criteria.  The more noncompactness that 
mapmakers are willing to tolerate, the bigger the cushion it can provide itself to ameliorate risk.  It 
is worth noting, therefore, that Cain’s relatively sanguine assessment that partisan gerrymandering 
can be kept within acceptable bounds without judicial intervention seems to rest on the assumption 
that redistricters won’t “resort[] to wildly noncompact shapes.”  Id. at 150. 
316. Just as a single constitutional operative proposition (i.e., a court’s understanding of 
constitutional meaning) could be successfully administered by a variety of decision rules, a single 
decision rule could be well suited to administer more than one operative proposition.  I have 
proposed the decision rule in the text as a means to implement what we might call the Vieth 
operative proposition—a constitutional ban on excessive partisanship in redistricting, as this Article 
fleshes out what “excessive partisanship” means.  As it happens, however, this same decision rule, 
or something very much like it, might constitute an appropriate means to implement the Baker 
operative proposition that bars “arbitrary and capricious discrimination against individual voters 
with respect to the weight of their votes.”  See supra note 283 and accompanying text. 
 When adjudicating malapportionment challenges, courts have (understandably) indulged the 
legal fiction that a state’s population remains constant until the census reveals otherwise.  See, e.g., 
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 488 n.2 (2003).  No matter how obvious it might be to 
demographers that, because of differential rates of migration, mortality, or fertility, the population 
of one district is likely to grow faster or slower than in another, courts assume that districts 
equipopulous at the start of a districting cycle remain equipopulous throughout the cycle.  This 
makes sense when the districts are created at the cycle’s start.  But to respect this fiction even when 
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remanded the Texas litigation can announce this rule.317  I believe that it 
should. 
Let me consider three objections.  Critics might object, first, that mid-
decade redistricting is constitutionally permissible.318  And so it is.  This is 
where my approach—which depends heavily on an explicit and reasonably 
precise distinction between judge-interpreted constitutional meaning and the 
doctrinal rules crafted to implement that meaning—differs from those 
advanced by the Session plaintiffs319 and by other academic commentators.320  
The instant question is whether the incidence of excessive partisanship in 
mid-decade redistrictings is likely to be sufficiently high that it becomes 
reasonable to adopt a decision rule that directs courts to presume excessive 
partisanship from mid-decade redistricting.  I have already provided reasons 
to believe that the answer to that question is yes, and it is an answer that the 
empirical evidence supports.  The two modern instances of mid-decade 
congressional redistricting—Texas and Colorado—are widely understood as 
textbook examples of extreme partisanship. 
 
districts are created mid-cycle is an invitation to abuse.  Consequently, courts might reasonably 
adopt a decision rule that requires judges to presume that a mid-decade redistricting scheme 
constitutes an unconstitutional malapportionment unless, say, the state can meet the compelling 
interest test or can establish that the challenged plan comports, at the time of its introduction, with 
the demands of at least rough equipopulousness.  (I am indebted to Steve Bickerstaff and Renea 
Hicks for independently pressing this argument upon me.)  Indeed, an argument broadly consistent 
with this view (though not clearly distinguishing between operative propositions and decision rules, 
or between meaning and doctrine) has been urged upon the three-judge court in Session on remand.  
See Brief of University Professors Concerned about Equal Representation for Equal Numbers of 
People as Amicus Curiae, Session v. Perry (E.D. Tex. 2005) (No. 2:03-CV-354) [hereinafter Brief 
of University Professors as Amicus Curiae]. 
317. The Texas gerrymander involves congressional redistricting.  It is worth noting that a rule 
of this sort is, if anything, even more obviously appropriate in cases of mid-decade redrawing of 
electoral districts for state legislatures.  As Justice Breyer argues in his Vieth dissent, 
gerrymandering is most profoundly antithetical to democratic principles when it serves to entrench a 
minority party in power for an extended period of time.  See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 
1825 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  That can happen if a state legislature becomes controlled by a 
party with minority electoral support and then redraws the electoral districts in its favor.  But if 
redistricting occurs only once a decade, then the minority party that seeks to entrench itself must 
craft new electoral lines that give it a majority not only in the immediately following election, but in 
the election eight years later that will produce the legislature that will next redistrict.  The 
demographic changes that naturally occur over the course of a decade might make entrenchment of 
this sort difficult.  We might say that if partisan gerrymandering stacks the electoral deck against the 
disfavored party, demographic changes somewhat reshuffle that deck before it can be stacked again.  
Not so if the minority party can redistrict every few years.  Simply put, frequent and partisan 
redistricting is all the more dangerous when what is at stake includes the power to redistrict itself.  
Off-cycle partisan gerrymandering of state electoral districts cannot be tolerated by anyone who 
worries about minority entrenchment. 
318. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 594 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
319. Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 308, at 11 (arguing that the Court should hold that the 
Constitution bars “congressional redistricting motivated solely by partisanship” when the “mid-
decade replacement of a perfectly lawful plan has nothing to do with population equality”). 
320. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 248, at 777–78 (advancing a procedural rule that would prohibit 
states from redistricting outside the decennial census cycle). 
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To be sure, a decision rule of this sort might be modestly overinclusive: 
Some mid-decade redistrictings might not issue from excessive partisan 
motivation.  But a modest degree of overbreadth does not doom an otherwise 
manageable standard.  Indeed, that is one important lesson that the distinction 
between operative propositions and decision rules is designed to teach.  
Moreover, the degree of likely overbreadth ought not to be overstated.  Here, 
as elsewhere, strict scrutiny need not be fatal in fact.  As the Texas litigation 
itself evidences, states might contend that the mid-decade redistricting was 
justified to cure a grossly partisan plan adopted by the previous legislature.321  
Perhaps a “remedial” objective of this sort ought to qualify as a compelling 
state interest.  If so, the challenged mid-decade plan should be upheld so long 
as it is narrowly tailored to cure the prior partisan offense, not to replace one 
excessively partisan plan with its mirror image. 
A second and related objection takes the form of a distinction: Even if a 
decision rule of the sort I propose might be appropriately applied to off-cycle 
redistrictings adopted to replace a valid plan that had itself been adopted in 
the democratically preferred way—by the legislature or by a districting 
commission—it should not apply where, as in Texas, the mid-decade redis-
tricting was enacted to replace a court-ordered plan.  This is not a wholly 
implausible position.  But it is not ultimately persuasive. 
It is true that courts have often assumed that their plans are only stopgap 
measures that legislatures are constitutionally free to replace.  Nothing I have 
said is to the contrary.  But, again, the important question is not whether it is 
constitutionally permissible to redistrict mid-decade, whether replacing a 
court-ordered plan or even a legislatively adopted one.  For the answer to that 
question is clear: it is permissible, but only so long as the mid-decade redis-
tricting does not exhibit excessive partisanship (or any other constitutional 
vice).  The appropriate question, rather, is whether a single-party controlled 
legislature that exercises its option to replace a court-ordered plan with one 
of its own devising is likely to be motivated by excessive partisanship.  And, 
in answering that question, it is surely relevant that states rarely if ever 
accept the invitation to replace a court-drawn plan when permitted to do 
so.322  When the legislature is under bipartisan control, the benefits of 
redistricting when not required are rarely thought to outweigh the costs. 
More pointedly, to except from the decision rule cases where the state 
redistricts mid-decade to replace a court-ordered plan that was adopted 
 
321. See Motion to Affirm at 5, Jackson v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex 2004) (No. 
03-1391) (characterizing the 2003 redistricting as an effort to “remov[e] the dead-hand effect of the 
1991 Democratic gerrymander”). 
322. See Brief of University Professors as Amicus Curiae, supra note 316, at 9 n.10 (reviewing 
all of the cases cited in Session as support for the proposition that courts generally assume that the 
plans they adopt can be changed or replaced by subsequent legislative action and concluding that, 
“[a]lthough in some instances the state legislature enacted laws codifying a court’s plans, it does not 
appear that in any of the cases the state legislature enacted a substantively new redistricting plan”). 
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because the state had failed to act would encourage precisely the evil we are 
seeking to prevent.  If a party lacked control of the state government, but 
anticipated gaining control in the next election, they could block passage of 
any redistricting scheme, thereby parking the issue in the courts until they 
could successfully work an extreme partisan gerrymander.  Indeed, some 
expert observers contend that is exactly what the Texas Republicans did.  In 
2001, Republicans controlled the Texas State Senate and the Governorship, 
while Democrats clung to a thin majority in the State House.  Yet, instead of 
compromising with their Democratic colleagues, these commentators claim, 
the Republicans made a tactical decision to let the redistricting go to federal 
court just so they could replace whatever plan the judges adopted with an 
extreme partisan gerrymander as soon as the 2002 state elections turned the 
house over to Republican control.323 
To protect against such tactics, courts should apply the mid-decade 
decision rule proposed above even when the challenged redistricting replaces 
a court-ordered plan—at least when the court-ordered plan was a response to 
the state’s failure, as in Texas, to enact any redistricting scheme at all.  I 
leave open the possibility that the decision rule should not be applied when a 
mid-decade plan adopted by a single-party controlled government replaces a 
judicially drawn map that had been ordered as a remedy following judicial 
invalidation of a timely enacted legislative scheme.  How to deal with that 
small corner of the possible universe of cases raises an important question, 
but not one that must be resolved in order to dispose of the Texas case. 
If the second objection urges that the off-cycle decision rule is 
overbroad, a third objection, or combination of objections, might react to the 
rule’s admitted underinclusiveness—the fact that it has no application to 
cases of on-cycle redistricting.  I take it that the underinclusiveness of this 
rule could not be a decisive objection against it if the effective upshot were 
that claims of unconstitutionally partisan on-cycle redistricting were 
nonjusticiable.  Surely this is an objection that members of the Vieth 
plurality, and its defenders, would be singularly ill-situated to advance.  To 
paraphrase Justice Scalia from a dissimilar context, if it is constitutionally 
permissible for the Court not to enforce constitutional meaning at all, surely 
it is constitutionally permissible for the Court to enforce constitutional 
meaning a little.324  In short, those who would hold claims that a legislature 
 
323. As John Alford, a Rice political scientist and one-time expert witness for Governor Perry, 
explained, “Republicans used the court-drawn plan as a place to park redistricting until they could 
address the issue when they were in control of the House and obviously better off in the Senate.”  
David M. Halbfinger, Across U.S., Redistricting as a Never-Ending Battle, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 
2003, at A1 (quoting Professor Alford). 
324. “If it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal, 
surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring 
homosexual conduct.”  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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has enacted an unconstitutionally excessive partisan gerrymander 
nonjusticiable lack standing to complain if justiciability is preserved but the 
claims are adjudicated by means of an underenforcing decision rule.325 
A more plausible worry, I suppose, arises if the negative implication of 
this off-cycle decision rule is not that on-cycle redistricting is nonjusticiable.  
If, instead, claims challenging “ordinary” redistricting should be adjudicated 
under the default (and essentially invisible) more-likely-than-not standard, 
then the familiar cries about the unmanageability of the task again rise to the 
surface.  But there is a third possibility: This one decision rule that, by its 
terms, applies only to off-cycle redistricting ought to be supplemented by one 
or more decision rules that apply in the more usual context of on-cycle redis-
tricting.  The following two examples are intended to suggest that such rules 
can be crafted, and therefore that the underinclusiveness of this one decision 
rule ought not to prevent its adoption. 
2. Departures from a Bipartisan Status Quo.—I have argued that the 
best understanding of what it means for a state to exhibit excessive 
partisanship in redistricting depends upon the notion of a counterfactual 
baseline: The electoral success the party in control can be expected to have 
realized under the scheme it would have adopted had it not considered 
partisan outcomes at all.  I have also acknowledged that the difficulty in 
identifying this counterfactual baseline constitutes one problem—the biggest 
problem—for operationalizing this understanding.  It is therefore tempting to 
somehow generate this counterfactual baseline from the status quo ante. 
As the Texas litigation exemplifies, however, state defendants are likely 
to object to this maneuver on the grounds that the status quo itself is the 
product of partisan manipulation by the previous party in power.326  This can 
be a fair objection.  But only when the opposing party effectively controlled 
redistricting the last time around.  This suggests another retail decision rule: 
Whenever a redistricting scheme was adopted under conditions of single-
party control to replace a plan that was not (i.e., if the prior scheme had been 
adopted by a court, a nonpartisan commission, or a legislature under 
conditions of divided government), courts should presume327 that the 
 
325. Of course, the putative greater does not always include the lesser.  And it would be 
entirely consistent with his judicial philosophy were Justice Scalia to resist this claimed lesser 
(judicial deployment of an underenforcing decision rule) in favor of the claimed greater (a total 
refusal to adjudicate claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering) if the underenforcing 
decision rule here proposed relied on the sort of judicial subjectivity that Scalia denounces.  But it 
doesn’t.  The predicate for application of the rule—that the redistricting was adopted mid-decade 
under conditions of single-party control—can be determined almost mechanically.  And the 
compelling interest test, albeit somewhat subjective, is a doctrinal staple. 
326. See supra note 321. 
327. I put aside how, if at all, the presumption could be overcome, except to acknowledge that 
to construe the presumption as a mere burden-shifting mechanism is not likely to allay the Court’s 
manageability concerns.  It might be appropriate to require states to produce clear and convincing 
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challenged plan reflects excessive partisanship if it can be expected to net for 
the dominant party a proportion of the seats in the next election that exceeds 
by more than x% (say, for illustration, 20%) the proportion of the seats it had 
averaged under the prior plan. 
3. Disparate Shacking.—As already noted, the two fundamental 
partisan gerrymandering tools are to make the opposing party’s districts 
highly inefficient and to make one’s own party’s districts efficient.  These 
twin tactics are familiarly termed “packing” and “cracking.”  A third tactic—
what Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela Karlan label “shacking”—involves 
“redrawing the lines to place the residences of two incumbents in the same 
district, thereby forcing at least one of them out of office.”328  Given the 
traditionally recognized state interest in protecting and enhancing its 
influence in the national legislature by protecting its congressional 
incumbents, partisanship is overwhelmingly likely to be at work whenever a 
party uses its control of the state redistricting process to shack incumbents 
from the opposing party.  Disparate shacking, therefore, serves as a natural 
predicate for the construction of a sensible decision rule.  One such rule, for 
example, could direct courts to presume constitutionally excessive 
partisanship whenever a challenged plan adopted by a single-party controlled 
legislature shacks more incumbents from the out party than incumbents from 
the in party. 
V. Conclusion 
Despite the splintering it produced, the Court’s decision in Vieth v. 
Jubelirer announces clearly that excessive partisanship in redistricting is 
unconstitutional.  The remaining challenge, accordingly, is to craft judicially 
manageable standards to administer this constitutional norm.  Unfortunately, 
the difficulty of the task is commensurate with its importance. 
For those, like Justice Kennedy, who are prepared to take the challenge 
seriously, the first step must be to make clearer what we mean by excessive 
partisanship.  Remarkably, though, legal scholars and political scientists have 
generally overlooked this need in their rush to formulate manageable tests.  
Votes-to-seat ratios, S-curves, swing ratios, and compactness measures might 
or might not be judicially administrable.  But they are assuredly irrelevant 
unless they bear upon what it means for a redistricting to be infected by 
excessive partisanship, in the constitutionally relevant sense. 
However, before we can even take a stab at articulating the line that 
separates permissible amounts or degrees of partisanship from excessive 
 
evidence regarding what it claims an electoral map untainted by partisan motivation would have 
looked like. 
328. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 181, at 552. 
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amounts, we must first conceptualize partisanship as something that can exist 
in amounts or degrees.  We need, that is, to conceptualize partisanship in 
redistricting in scalar, not just binary, terms.  This Article has identified four 
conceptually and practically distinct scalar notions of partisanship, and has 
argued in favor of one of the four—one that employs an ends-based measure 
and a counterfactual baseline.  It follows that the best sense to be made of 
excessive partisanship is this: A districting scheme manifests excessive 
partisanship, hence is unconstitutional, if the controlling party is trying to 
grab too many more seats than it would likely receive under the plan it would 
have adopted had it not considered partisanship at all.  This conception of 
excessive partisanship does not rely upon proportional representation or 
principles of “fair” districting. 
To nail down what we mean by excessive partisanship is a critical step 
in the project of implementing Vieth, but only the first.  Courts must then 
craft manageable doctrine to administer this understanding.  Put in terms I 
have proposed, courts must announce one or more constitutional “decision 
rules” to implement this fleshed-out understanding of constitutional meaning.  
This Article has proposed several decision rules that could fit the bill.  In so 
doing, it has demonstrated, I hope, that courts can manage gerrymandering—
adequately, not, to be sure, perfectly.  In denying that this was possible, the 
four Vieth Justices who would have held claims of partisan gerrymandering 
nonjusticiable were, as Justice Kennedy suspected, precipitous. 
But it is not essential that the Supreme Court ultimately sanction any 
one of the particular decision rules here advanced.  More important is that the 
Court clearly conceptualize both excessive partisanship (as a ban on an 
excessive pursuit of partisan advantage relative to what advantage would 
have accrued to the dominant party “naturally,” which is to say, 
counterfactually) and the logical structure of constitutional adjudication (as 
consisting of judge-interpreted constitutional meanings and judge-crafted 
decision rules that direct judges how to determine whether those meanings 
have been complied with).  If the Court does these things, then the stage will 
be set for lower courts, aided by scholars and litigants, to craft decision rules 
that can sensibly manage the constitutional command that all nine Justices 
recognized in Vieth: States may not pursue excessive partisanship in 
redistricting. 
